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This thesis examines the legality of unauthorized reproduction of in-copyright works for the purpose of being used in Machine Learning processes. It focuses primarily on US and EU copyright systems as environments for Artificial Intelligence technological developments. 
Machine Learning uses of creative works differ from traditional ones: they do not involve human readers, they do not display protected expression to the public and they analyse works to extract information not protected by copyright. Hence they raise a question of whether they actually should fall within a reach of exclusive rights of copyright holders. 
In respect of the US copyright system, this study addresses the fair use doctrine that under certain conditions allows unauthorized reproduction of works. The research makes an attempt to apply the doctrine to Machine Learning uses by drawing parallels with recent case law on other technological uses of copyrighted works. 
As regards the EU copyright realities, this research discusses Machine Learning uses within the scope of newly proposed copyright exception for Text and Data Mining. It firstly analyses whether exempting these uses from a copyright reach would meet the three-step test requirements. After that, it critically assesses the scopes of the exception proposed and negotiated on the EU policymaking level. 
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Tämä tutkimus käsittelee tekijänoikeuksien alaisten teosten luvatonta kopiointia koneoppimistarkoituksiin. Tutkimus keskittyy ensisijaisesti Yhdysvaltojen ja EU:n tekijänoikeusjärjestelmiin, jotka ovat tekoälyn kehittämisen ympäristöjä. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The modern era of technological development is often referred to as the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution and Artificial Intelligence (hereinafter AI) plays a crucial role in 
shaping the future of our society. However, the current legal system might not be ready 
to accommodate new technologies. In particular, this thesis is focusing on the 
application of AI and Machine Learning (hereinafter ML) in the field of creative 
economy, where all players have to follow often very strict rules called Copyright. 
In fact, the present narrative is nothing new to a copyright-educated reader. The history 
knows many examples of new emerging technologies not fitting into traditional uses of 
protected works. For example, player pianos and Sony’s Betamax VCR to name but 
two1. The reaction of copyright law and rightholders was typically predictable: “they 
usually tried to force them back into the shadows”2. And the story of AI vs Copyright is 
not promising a different scenario - rightholders would try their best to extend their 
rights also to new uses of their intellectual property. 
The peculiar thing about ML uses of copyrighted works is that it raises a question of 
whether they are uses of works at all within its traditional understanding. Works are 
being copied, but without intention to be read. At least not by humans: computer 
readership of human authorship3. Works are used, but not as works. They are used 
rather as something else - carriers of data4. 
Under Copyright, a work is usually perceived as a communicative act and not as a thing. 
This theory especially makes sense in a digital age, when making one extra copy can be 
done at zero costs with only one click. To copy a work under the Copyright is thus to 
                                               1 See US cases White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 US 1 (1908) and Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 2 Mezei, P. 2013, “The Role of Technology and Consumers’ Needs in the Evolution of Copyright Law – From Gutenberg to the Filesharers”. Éva Jakab (Ed.): Geistiges Eigentum und Urheberrecht aus der historischen Perspektive, Lectiones Juridicae 10, Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, Szeged, 2014, p. 71-79. Available at SSRN: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2199352> [2018, 24.11] or <www.dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2199352> [2018, 24.11]. P. 71. 3 Grimmelmann, J. 2016, “Copyright for literate robots”, Iowa Law Review, vol. 101, no. 2, pp. 657. 4 Karapapa, S. & Borghi, M. 2013, Copyright and Mass Digitization, Oxford University Press, Oxford. P. 15. 
2 
recommunicate it. Therefore “uses of the work as a mere pattern of ink in the absence of 
recommunication” should not be regarded as “uses of the work as a work”5. 
Things are getting even more complicated when such ML use of copyrighted materials 
results into the creation of a new expressive work. Should authors of original works 
used as training data also have rights in those new creations? Is there any chance of AI-
plagiarism? Can the subsequent work amount to a derivative of originals on which AI 
model was trained? These and other related questions are addressed in this research. 
This study is mostly based on the legal dogmatic method of research. It focuses on a 
current state of the US Copyright law with its fair use doctrine developed through a 
range of court decisions. Similarly, it examines the EU Copyright law with its copyright 
exceptions prescribed by the InfoSoc Directive6. 
In addition, not only current law itself but also lawmaking process and related 
circumstances are addressed here. In particular, the European Commission (hereinafter 
Commission) official studies and impact assessment documentation are taken as an 
important source of information about the background of the ongoing copyright reform. 
It helps to view the TDM copyright exception through the prism of the main objectives 
of the proposal. 
The thesis employs the law and economics approach to argue that ML uses do not harm 
economic interests of rightholders and thus must be allowed. Similarly, from the law 
and sociology standpoint, this work stresses on the importance of AI technologies for 
the future of humankind. Therefore, the EU copyright must adapt to facilitate its 
development and safeguard the EU competitiveness in the AI research on the 
international arena. 
The current state of law does not explicitly regulate ML uses of works that are analysed 
here. Therefore answering the main research question is more about lex ferenda - what 
the law should be or how existing law should apply to future cases. That still requires 
evaluating what the law is now - lex lata. With that in mind, this study discusses a 
present legal system with an aim to foresee future developments in copyright law. 
                                               5 Drassinower, A. 2015, What’s Wrong with Copying? Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. P. 87. 6 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
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The fact that this study is targeting US and EU Copyright regimes does not imply a 
direct objective to compare them and identify which is more favourable for developing 
AI. It is a well-known fact that the US fair use doctrine is more flexible towards new 
technological uses. However, this discussion is not aiming to advocate an adoption of an 
open copyright clause in the EU or to discuss its benefits. It is rather attempting to 
assess copyright realities on two continents that are viewed as leaders in global 
economy. 
In regard to limitations, this thesis encompasses specifically ML uses of copyrighted 
works that would lead to a subsequent generation of new expressive materials. 
Naturally, there are no major issues with authorized uses and the study is aiming to 
examine copying without a prior permission. In terms of the creative outcome, i.e. AI-
generated work, it is only a relation to original works and copyright holders’ rights that 
are addressed here. The study avoids detailed discussion of the copyrightability of such 
creative output despite its evident importance. 
Essentially, this thesis is an attempt to analyse a current state of copyright law in respect 
of ML uses of protected works and to conceptualise what it might be in a foreseeable 
future. In order to achieve this objective, the study goes through three main stages. 
Following this introductory part the second chapter introduces a reader to fundamentals 
of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence. It then discusses application of AI and 
ML in the field of creative economy: its benefits and challenges. An examination of 
copyright-related acts involved in ML uses of works closes the chapter. 
The third chapter reviews available court decisions in cases of technological uses of 
copyrighted works. It is built in such a way that each kind of use e.g. web caching, 
image thumbnailing and library digitization is discussed in parallel within US and EU 
jurisdictions. The chapter starts with a short introduction to the US doctrine of fair use 
and  ends with summary comments on the main cases. The case law discussed here is 
not new and had been sufficiently scrutinised by scholars. Therefore a reader, familiar 
with adaptation of the fair use doctrine to new technological uses in the US and EU 
courts struggling in this matters, may proceed directly to the next chapter. 
Fourth and fifth chapters may be viewed as a core part of this thesis. They primarily 
discuss applicability of current legal system to the uses in question. Each chapter 
includes two main divisions assessing uses on the input and then on the output stages. 
The fourth chapter is dealing with the US copyright realities and its fair use doctrine. 
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The fifth chapter discusses the EU copyright law accordingly. It is mainly focusing on 
the recently proposed copyright exception for Text and Data Mining (hereinafter TDM) 
uses. It was necessary firstly to establish connection between ML and AI on the one 
hand and TDM on another. The chapter then follows with a broad discussion of the 
scopes of the proposal including some criticism and suggestions. The whole thesis 
traditionally ends with discussions and conclusions.  
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2. AI MEETS COPYRIGHT 
“Computers are useless. They can only give you 
answers.” (by Pablo Picasso)7. Is true no more. 
2.1. Basics of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
AI itself is a broad term and encompasses various applications most of which are 
irrelevant to this study. Nonetheless, it is necessary to understand the basics of an 
essential part to AI - the process it is based on - Machine Learning. Analysing activities 
involved in ML will help to better comprehend the challenges these new technologies 
pose for lawmakers today. 
The most popular understanding of ML takes its origin from 1959 and was informally 
defined by Arthur Samuel as a technique that gives computer systems ability to “learn” 
and progressively improve from experience without being explicitly programmed8. He 
came up with this definition in a course of his work on a checkers program, which 
would learn to play checkers game by playing against itself. In other words, ML enables 
computers to “learn” from input data practically autonomously, without any 
intervention from the human side. 
More modern and formal definition of ML was developed by Tom M. Mitchell and 
according to him “a computer program is set to learn from an experience E with respect 
to some task T and some performance measure P if its performance on T as measured 
by P improves with experience E”9. It does not require special computer science 
background to recognize the enormous potential of ML technologies capable to improve 
its performance on some particular task operating autonomously. It is especially true in 
regard to programs and applications that cannot be programmed by hand in a traditional 
way and it is especially true in the era of Big Data. 
                                               7 Quoteinvestigator 2011, Nov 5, - last update. Computers Are Useless. They Can Only Give You Answers. Available: <www.quoteinvestigator.com/2011/11/05/computers-useless/> [2018, 24.11]. 8 Samuel, A. L. 1959, “Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers”, IBM Journal of Research and Development, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 210-229. 9 Mitchell, T. 1997, Machine Learning, McGraw Hill. P. 2. 
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There are three main types of ML that determine how the process of “learning” is 
actually happening: supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning10. 
Supervised learning is also sometimes called predictive. It requires that training dataset 
includes labelled input-output pairs. For example, an image depicting a human face 
would be labelled as the one that includes human face and images without a human face 
would be labelled accordingly. Then training AI model will need to learn a mapping 
from inputs to outputs to be able to determine whether there is a human face on a 
random unlabelled picture. This approach is for instance used in face detection 
(recognition), handwriting recognition technologies etc. 
Unsupervised learning is sometimes called descriptive. In this case, an AI model is only 
provided with inputs and then is asked to find “interesting patterns (structure)” in the 
data. Therefore it is sometimes referred to as knowledge discovery. For example, 
pictures would be uploaded without telling any identifying information and then the 
program will by itself manipulate the data and produce uncovered structures. It can be 
grouping by human face presence/absence or any other factor that never could even be 
envisioned by the programmer. Unsupervised learning is particularly useful in 
discovering new knowledge that could not be foreseen in advance and with a huge load 
of data that would be difficult or even unrealistic to label. Moreover, unlabelled data is 
cheaper to acquire and usually contains more information11. 
Reinforcement learning is a less used type of ML and was inspired by behaviourist 
psychology. It is also associated with the trial and mistake method. This is particularly 
useful for robotic AI to teach it how to act or behave when given occasional reward or 
punishment signals12. The practical example of reinforcement learning application from 
2017 is Google’s AI DeepMind “training several simulated bodies on a diverse set of 
challenging terrains and obstacles, using a simple reward function based on forward 
progress”13. It proved to be an effective way to teach an AI to move through a number 
of different and challenging obstacles. 
The common principle in ML stipulates that the more data used to train the AI model 
the better quality the result will have. The same is true about the quality of the training 
                                               10 Murphy, K.P. 2012, Machine learning, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. P. 2. 11 Ibid, p. 10. 12 Ibid, p. 2. 13 Heess, N. et al. 2017, “Emergence of Locomotion Behaviours in Rich Environments”, arXiv. Available: <www.arxiv.org/abs/1707.02286> [2018, 24.11]. 
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data used. The role of developers is to set the right algorithms; however, it is the quality 
and quantity of training data that determines the final outcome. 
Terms “ML” and “AI” are sometimes used interchangeably although it would be 
technically incorrect to equate them. The latter one is much broader and includes the 
former one. Without going into details, it should be enough to say that “AI is a branch 
of analytics that goes beyond machine learning, providing the system with the ability to 
reason”14. In other words, while ML capabilities are limited by what was used in 
training dataset, AI can go further from this point by making hypotheses and trying to 
understand new information. This thesis will refer to these two terms rather equally 
since they carry a similar meaning in the copyright context. 
Overall, ML processes are designed to be conducted without human interventions and 
only with limited control. That is its greatest strength and also a big challenge since an 
AI that lacks self-awareness is unable to explain its output and it makes it difficult for 
developers or other interested parties to analyse rationale behind the result. Instead, it 
depends largely on the input data and applicable algorithms15. 
This shall not, however, be understood that developers do not have any idea about what 
their ML programs are doing. A developer using a pen, lots of paper, calculator and the 
same input data could arrive at the same results as machines do. However, comparing 
with a machine, that would take much longer time for the human. In other words, it is 
indeed possible for developers to analyse the rationale behind an AI-generated result, 
but that would be a very time-intensive and difficult task16. 
2.2. AI and creative economy 
Approaching the main questions of this paper is well to start mentioning that the ML 
has been being widely applied in the field of the creative economy recently. For the 
purpose of this analysis creative economy is a part of the economy “where value is 
based on novel imaginative qualities rather than the traditional resources of land, 
                                               14 Brooks, R. 2017, Oct 24, - last update, AI vs Machine Learning (part 3 of series). Available: <www.guavus.com/clarifying-ai-vs-machine-learning-part-3-series/> [2018, 24.11]. 15 World Economic Forum 2018. Creative disruption: the impact of emerging technologies on the creative economy, Cologny/Geneva, p. 8. Available: <www3.weforum.org/docs/39655_CREATIVE-DISRUPTION.pdf> [2018, 24.11]. 16 Thoma, M. 2016, “Creativity in Machine Learning”, arXiv. Available: <www.arxiv.org/abs/1601.03642> [2018, 24.11]. P. 1. 
8 
labour and capital”17. This covers creative activities involving music, film, literature, 
fashion, paintings, architecture, design etc. Copyright plays a central role in governing 
these endeavours and has to change constantly in response to new technological 
challenges. 
It is no more surprising to read news about ML creating new original content 
throughout multiple industries. For instance, Washington Post developed an AI called 
Heliograf to write articles to cover sports and political news18; at Google, AI invented 
sounds that humans have never heard before19; a movie was made out of script written 
by an algorithm20. Completely new business models were established that operate solely 
on AI platforms, such as Amper21 and Jukedeck22 services offering low-cost high-
quality AI-created music that is in demand among bloggers, game developers etc. 
Furthermore, according to some researchers, AI will be able to write high-school essays 
by 2026, compose top 40 pop-songs by 2027 and write New York Times bestselling 
books by 204923. This is clearly an evidence of how ML is disrupting creative industries 
nowadays on a large scale. 
One of the benefits of the new technological solutions in respect of creative economy 
appears to be in transforming the value chain of the creative content production. There 
is no more a need to hire a professional translator with the availability of high-quality 
and, what is more important, free translation service provided by Google. Similarly, in 
some cases, it is more efficient to use Jukedeck services instead of paying to a 
professional musician. Removing some intermediary stakeholders from the value chain 
makes content creation more affordable and opens new possibilities for small and 
medium creators. It is a rational measure applied within the incentive of cost 
minimization and benefit maximization that is so essential for any business activity. 
                                               17 Howkins, J. 2013, The creative economy, Penguin. Chap 1. 18 Moses, L. 2017, Sep 14, - last update, The Washington Post’s robot reporter has published 850 articles in the past year. Available: <www.digiday.com/media/washington-posts-robot-reporter-published-500-articles-last-year/> [2018, 24.11]. 19 Metz, C. 2017, May 15, - last update, Google’s AI invents sounds humans have never heard before. Available: <www.wired.com/2017/05/google-uses-ai-create-1000s-new-musical-instruments/> [2018, 24.11].  20 Newitz, A. 2016, Sep 6, - last update, Movie written by algorithm turns out to be hilarious and intense. Available: <www.arstechnica.com/gaming/2016/06/an-ai-wrote-this-movie-and-its-strangely-moving/> [2018, 24.11].  21 Amper Music website. Available: <www.ampermusic.com/> [2018, 24.11]. 22 Jukedeck. Fuelling creativity using musical AI. Available: <www.jukedeck.com/> [2018, 24.11]. 23 Grace et al. 2017, May 30, “When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts”, arXiv. Available: <www.arxiv.org/abs/1705.08807> [2018, 24.11]. 
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Another and probably more important value of ML is in potential discoveries that could 
be achieved via technological analysis of data. For example, there is a big number of 
publications containing valuable information from various fields of knowledge: biology, 
medicine, chemistry, physics etc. ML technology allows processing and analysing far 
more information than humans could ever do by simple reading. 
Moreover, it allows creating an AI model specialising in some particular field, e.g. 
medicine or physics, to help human make better practical decisions in their everyday 
professional activities, e.g. treating patients, discovering new drugs, creating new 
materials with improved characteristics etc. However, most of the relevant information 
that could be used as training datasets is copyright protected and authorization is 
normally required. 
As it follows, there are currently two main constraints regarding the application of AI in 
the creative industry. First is a lack of access to relevant high-quality data to conduct 
research and to make important discoveries. In order to avoid any potential copyright 
liability, researchers have to play safely in regard to the source of training data. It forces 
them to use materials from the public domain, Creative Commons-licensed works or 
other legally low-risk content. However, the quality of such materials is not always 
appropriate to what ML is aiming to achieve. 
It must be remembered, that the quality and quantity of training data will determine the 
final AI output. One of the shortcomings associated with using “cheap” training data is 
a danger to create an AI system that will be biased in its outcomes. There are many 
cases of claiming some technological applications being racist or sexist. For example, 
an Asian student could not renew his passport online because the algorithm identified 
his eyes as being closed on the picture24. Some tested facial recognition technologies, 
trying to predict the risk of criminality, will tend to point at black people in 
disproportionally more cases25. 
                                               24 Cheng, S. 2016, Dec 7, - last update, An algorithm rejected an Asian man’s passport photo for having “closed eyes”. Available: <www.qz.com/857122/an-algorithm-rejected-an-asian-mans-passport-photo-for-having-closed-eyes/> [2018, 24.11]. 25 Angwin, J. 2016, May 23, - last update, Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the 
Country to Predict Future Criminals. And it’s Biased Against Blacks. Available: <www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing> [2018, 24.11]. 
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Amanda Levendowski refers to the biased AI problem as “garbage in, garbage out”26 
emphasising on the importance of qualitative data for training socially just AI. She 
argues that the Copyright system locks the most valuable content for the purpose of ML 
and that copyright exceptions or fair use must be put in place to solve the bias problem 
and create fairer AI. 
Benjamin Sobel, in contrast, assigns only limited role for copyright in making low-bias 
training data hard to access27. He claims first, that even copyright protected materials 
can bear biases and second, that genuinely high-quality datasets are “inaccessible not 
because of copyright law, but because of secrecy”28. Therefore, unveiling access to 
copyrighted data in the former case will not solve the problem of the biased AI and it is 
not copyright, but some other legal tools that lock valuable training data in the latter 
case. 
Certainly, it seems reasonable to claim that copyright protected works are of a larger 
value for ML purposes and their use as training data will to some extent improve 
preconditions for creating fairer AI. It can be explained by their greater relevance which 
stems from being comparatively new and based on the latest more credible information. 
Therefore, it is important to assess whether contemporary copyright law is ready to 
meet the needs of these new uses of protected works or whether some legislative 
interventions would be required. 
2.3. AI and copyrighted works 
Regardless of copyright liability risks associated with processing creative materials in 
ML operations, in practice, very few developers would choose a pace of clearing rights 
for the data they need. There may be several reasons for such behaviour: insufficient 
level of legal awareness among computer engineers, especially in respect of intellectual 
property rights; lack of knowledge about licensing possibilities or simply an absence of 
such licensing tools in regard to some specific kind of content etc. Unsurprisingly, the 
most common justification for using unauthorised materials in training datasets seems to 
be an unwillingness to pay for something that could be easily acquired by means of 
                                               26 Levendowski, A. 2018, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence's Implicit Bias Problem”. 93 Wash. L. Rev. 579 (2018), p. 6. Available at SSRN: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=3024938> [2018, 24.11]. 27 Sobel, B.L.W. 2017, “Artificial Intelligence's Fair Use Crisis”, The Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts, vol. 41, no. 1, p. 47. 28 Ibid., p. 48. 
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internet download and genuine belief, that the fair use will justify such acts (at least 
under the jurisdiction of the US copyright system). 
The problem with clearing rights and getting authorization from copyright holders is 
naturally in impracticability of doing this considering the number of individually taken 
pieces of original creations. It would be not only tremendously difficult to identify and 
contact every rightholder of, let’s say fifty thousand, pictures used in training an AI 
model, but also unreasonably expensive to provide some monetary reward for everyone 
involved. 
Transaction costs of such an undertaking might be too high compared to the objectives 
of the project, especially in the situation when the value of each separately taken work 
for the final outcome is comparatively low. The value of the training data is in its 
volume rather than in each separate work. Therefore, it will only make sense to acquire 
desirable content en masse rather than per unit. 
It is important to realise, that nowadays it is possible to find an institution ready to 
license out copyrighted materials for the purpose of computational analysis. Most likely 
it is only possible with respect to texts and images and under some strictly limited 
conditions. However, such offerings are so limited in number that it would be too soon 
to call it a formed market of copyrighted materials for ML purposes. Yet, the existence 
of this kind of market has important meaning in the debate whether copyright should 
tolerate the kind of unauthorised use discussed here. 
The reproduction right is often viewed as a core of copyright law. All other exclusive 
rights, shall it be distribution or making available to the public, involve this initial step - 
making a copy. In ML processes, reproduction can happen at many different stages and 
for the purpose of this research they will be classified into three main groups: a) 
copying of the materials to be used as input in the datasets; b) multiple copyings that 
happen in the “black box” during the actual ML processes; and c) potential reproduction 
when AI produces outcome similar to the work used in the training dataset. 
At the first stage, copying is an important step to prepare materials and include them in 
the training dataset. It may require digitization of paper literary works by means of 
scanning and optical character recognition (OCR) to make them readable by a 
computer. In fact, lots of materials nowadays are created and readily accessible in 
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digital format, e.g. electronic books, and yet reproduction is required to insert them in 
the dataset. 
At the same time, it is important to realise, that initial copying is not always essential 
for ML. An alternative way to learn from content is to use web “crawlers” that would 
analyse web content without actually copying them. In that case, there is no 
reproduction as such and thus no copyright infringement. Yet even this method of 
“learning” may still result in reproduction in the outcome. 
The second group of reproduction acts is less problematic due to its intermediate nature 
and, according to Sobel, “the spirit of copyright … seems to exempt this type of 
copying”. In fact, intermediary copying in normal situations would be allowed, provided 
that the initial use is lawful. On the other side, if the initial copying of works is not fair 
use or not exempted under the EU copyright law, these intermediate copying “... would 
be unlikely to further prejudice the defendant’s case”29. 
Finally, it is important to discuss the possibility of an AI model producing an infringing 
outcome. Firstly, the very purpose of developing an AI model may be a deliberate goal 
to create an application able to mimic some famous author of the original style. For 
example, well known Prisma photo editor mobile application “transforms your photos 
and videos into works of art using the styles of famous artists: Van Gogh, Picasso, 
Levitan, as well as world famous ornaments and patterns”30. 
While the works of aforementioned artists are likely to rest in the public domain, there 
are dozens of other styles imitating famous creators, for example, the style Mononoke 
which is based on Hayao Miyazaki’s Princess Mononoke - Japanese animated fantasy 
film. It is unknown whether Prisma Labs, Inc. obtained a license for using the original 
expressions in question; however, it can be argued that every picture edited with this 
style is likely to amount to some kind of adaptation of original expressions. 
Another remarkable example of ML use creating in style is a project conducted by 
Microsoft in collaboration with the bank ING in 2016 under the name The Next 
Rembrandt. In that project, an entire collection of Rembrandt’s works was examined 
                                               29 Ibid., p. 17. 30 Prisma Photo Editor. Available: <www.prisma-ai.com/> [2018, 24.11]. 
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employing deep learning algorithms and face recognition technologies to “distill the 
artistic DNA” and use it to create a new work31. 
The new painting was brought to life with help of latest 3D printers and was a different 
work, however mimicking original artistic style. Many commentators question who 
owns the copyright in the new production32, while it is no less important whether this 
new portrait shall be regarded as a derivative work and would require authorisation 
from Rembrandt if he was still alive. The answer may be not that obvious considering 
the fact that the new work is different from all pre-existing ones. It is not a copy of 
original expression, but rather a copy of artistic style, which is not protected by 
copyright or any other law. At least it is not protected yet. 
Secondly, even if an AI model was not intentionally designed to imitate original works, 
it may happen to do so to the level amounting to copyright infringement33. Normally, it 
would be an undesirable outcome signifying problems with learning process or just 
improbable incident. For example, an AI model was trained on thousands of books to 
learn how to write new original novels, but at some point, it reconstructs whole 
sentences from training data. Since it is very difficult to predict the outcome, the risk of 
getting AI-plagiarist still exists. 
Furthermore, even more complex infringement may happen when AI produces an 
outcome similar to work that was not used in training data. It is hypothetically possible 
when the input itself was based on other works. The probability of such indirect copying 
is higher than it seems to be due to the cumulativeness of creativity34. The principle “on 
the shoulders of giants” is equally relevant in this situation for humans and creative AI. 
However, arguably humans can be more careful in choosing expression in order to 
avoid copying.  
Unlike with intermediate copying, the legal implications of reproduction in the outcome 
do not entirely depend on the lawfulness of initial use of copyrighted works in a training 
                                               31 The Next Rembrandt. Available: <www.nextrembrandt.com/> [2018, 24.11]. 32 See e.g. Yanisky-Ravid, S. and Moorhead, S. 2017, Apr 24, “Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Accountability and Copyright - The Human-Like Workers Are Already Here - A New Model”. Michigan State Law Review, Award Winning: The 2017 Visionary Article in Intellectual Property Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2957722> [2018, 24.11] or <www.dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2957722> [2018, 24.11]; and Schlackman, S. 2016, 
“The Next Rembrandt: Who Holds the Copyright in Computer Generated Art”, ART L. J. Available: <alj.artlawjournal.com/the-next-rembrandt-who-holds-the-copyright-in-computer-generated-art> [2018, 24.11]. 33 Sobel, 2017, p. 18. 34 Ibid., p. 20. 
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dataset. In particular, owners or users of a creative AI risk facing liability even in the 
case when an AI was trained on authorised materials or when such original use was 
lawful for other reasons. This is an unfortunate consequence of unintentional copying 
that might take place in the case with AI designed to create original content.  
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3. TECHNOLOGICAL USAGE OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS 
3.1. General characteristics 
With the emergence of computer technologies more and more aspects of people’s lives 
have been moving from physical to digital world. This trend periodically gets 
accelerated with disruptive innovations like it was the case with the emergence of the 
internet, Wi-Fi, 2-3-4-5G etc. There hardly can be named a field of human activities that 
avoided the touch of a “digital hand”, and intellectual property in general and copyright, 
in particular, are far from those. In fact, a majority of intellectual creations nowadays 
take place in the digital world, and works from the pre-digital era are being successfully 
transferred from analogue to computer-readable format, i.e. digitised. 
The peculiar thing about digital versions of works is that they have to be reproduced 
every time they are processed by computer even when making a new copy is not a 
primary goal of such processing. There are nowadays many examples of technological 
tools that are based on the processing of copyrighted works without asking permission 
from appropriate rightholders. Technically, those uses constitute unauthorised 
reproduction of copyrighted works but, depending on the character, purpose or other 
criteria, some of them either exempted from copyright liability in the EU35 or deemed to 
be a fair use under the US copyright law. 
The ML use of copyrighted works shares many characteristics with other types of 
technological uses. Different scholars call these uses differently. For example, professor 
Matthew Sag refers to them as “copy-reliant technologies” meaning “technologies that 
copy expressive works for non-expressive ends”36. This study will now discuss specific 
attributes of those uses to outline their scopes and move to the analysis of their judicial 
assessment in the US and Europe likewise. 
The first important feature of technological uses of copyrighted works is a high volume 
of transactions or, as some refer to it, a bulk use. Works have to be used on a large scale 
                                               35 See for example temporary reproduction exception under the Art. 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. 36 Sag, M. 2009, “Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology” (April 9, 2009). Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 103, 2009; The DePaul University College of Law, Technology, Law & Culture Research Series Paper No. 09-001. Available at SSRN: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=1257086> [2018, 25.11], p. 3. 
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to ensure the proper functioning of the process. For example, Internet search engines 
rely a lot on Web Cache technologies that make web page copies in a view to provide 
access to them when original websites do not function properly or make it possible to 
track changes on the web pages. At the same time, websites often contain original 
content protected by copyright. Hence, web caching ipso facto constitutes a massive 
copying of copyright-protected content without prior authorisation from respecting 
website owners. 
Furthermore, works are being reproduced not only on a large scale but also entirely and 
verbatim. For example, plagiarism detection systems like Turnitin have to copy works 
completely word by word otherwise it would not be possible to effectively identify 
similarities between works that are being compared. This is very important from the 
copyright perspective since one of the fair use factors checks the amount of used work 
to determine whether a use can be considered fair. 
The example with web caching technologies is also great for another reason: there is a 
technical mechanism available for website owners to avoid being cached. In other 
words, copyright holders are provided with a possibility to opt out. However, it is 
contrary to an opt-in principle that copyright reproduction is based on. 
The author of this thesis is of opinion, that it is reasonable in a world of mass 
digitization to introduce an opt-out system for dealing with copyright protected works. 
Firstly, when certain bulk use qualifies with fair use criteria like it is the case with web 
caching in the US, it will be also fair towards rightholders to equip them with a right to 
withdraw from such engagement with their works. Secondly, in the EU copyright 
realities, provided that web caching is covered with a statutory exception, the opt-out 
mechanism would pay respect to authors’ moral rights enabling them to avoid any 
technical use that is in conflict with their feelings. 
Overall, rightholders should be better off with a right to avoid copying, given that such 
copying is lawful. However, in many instances, the lawfulness of a use may not be that 
clear. In addition, fair use is a defence based doctrine, meaning that fairness of the use 
can only be established in the court in each separate case. Furthermore, “copyright is a 
system of ex ante permissions” and, as some commentators put it, the introduction of the 
opt-out regime is “turning copyright on its head”37. 
                                               37 Karapapa & Borghi, 2013, p. 2. 
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Nevertheless, the availability of the opt-out mechanism should have no effect on the 
lawfulness of use. To put it differently, leaving rightholders with a right to opt out shall 
neither make the use lawful nor diminish any possible liability. In order to avoid a 
copyright infringement, a user must either obtain prior permission or solely rely on 
copyright exceptions or fair use. The possibility to opt out is rather a credit of respect to 
author’s right of integrity and shall have no independent copyright meaning in the 
legality assessment. 
Probably the most important feature of technological uses is that they do not aim to 
demonstrate any expressive elements of the works to the public. This is a strong 
argument weighing in favour of exempting these uses from copyright infringement 
since they do not encroach on what is considered to be an exclusive monopoly of 
authors - a privilege to communicate their expressiveness to the public. 
It can be argued, however, that Internet search engines by providing access to cached 
web pages make them available to everyone upon request. They communicate 
information that otherwise could not be accessible, for instance, if the original source 
was deleted. That tends to look like a clear copyright infringement case, yet it is not 
prohibited due to the very different purpose such cached pages serve. More discussion 
will follow later in a corresponding section. 
3.2. Technological usage case study 
Before starting a case-by-case analysis of technological uses of copyrighted works it 
would be helpful to provide some introduction to the US doctrine of the fair use to make 
a further discussion more comprehensive. The doctrine is codified in the §107 of the US 
Copyright Act and is used as a defence tool in cases with unauthorised copying. Courts 
have to consider four main factors to determine whether the copying is non-infringing, 
namely: 
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; 
2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
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4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.38 
It must be remembered, those four factors are not cumulative and non-exclusive, thus 
they provide courts with a broad flexibility in determining the fairness of a use in each 
case. More specifically, those factors do not weight equally and, traditionally, courts 
have given the most weight to the first and fourth factors39. In fact, it is up to a court to 
decide which factors have a determinative value. Courts would also refer to some 
general principles, other factors like a market failure or public benefit of a secondary 
use. 
The doctrine was extensively analysed and interpreted by a sitting judge Pierre N Leval 
in his influential article “Toward a Fair Use Standard”40. To him, the first factor, “the 
purpose and character of the use”, is “the heart and soul of a fair use case”41. The 
secondary use of work has to be transformative, meaning that: 
“The use must be productive and must employ the [original work] in a different manner 
or for a different purpose than the original . . . If . . . the secondary use adds value to 
the original — if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation 
of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings — this is the very 
type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of 
society.”42 
This interpretation was mainly aiming to stimulate creative transformations of original 
works adding to an ultimate goal “to promote the progress of science and useful arts”43. 
Later the doctrine was further expanded to address purely technological uses in a way 
that more attention was paid to the “different manner or a different purpose”. 
To demonstrate the difference between two rationales, the old approach would focus on 
how the original work was changed (transformed) into the secondary creation. The                                                38 United States Constitution, § 107. 39 Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (focusing primarily on first factor and whether use is transformative) and Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114-15 (2d Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment of fair use for parody based primarily on the first fair use factor) with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) (“[The fourth] factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”). 40 Leval, P.N. 1990, “Toward a Fair Use Standard”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 103, no. 5, pp. 1105-1136. 41 Karapapa & Borghi, 2013, p. 22. 42 Leval, 1990, p. 1111. 43 Article 1, sec 8, clause 8 of the U.S.C., often referred to as the “Copyright Clause”. 
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second one addresses the question “in which way?” the work is used. The former 
requires some creative input and adding new meaning44, while the latter one is pleased 
with a new application, new “function” of the use even when little if any, changes are 
made. 
This later application of the doctrine to technological uses is often associated with a so-
called “functionality test”. The test essentially stipulates that the fair use defence may be 
invoked when a secondary work performs a different function than that of the original, 
regardless of any similarities between the two of them.45 
3.2.1. Web page caching 
Web caching is a particularly good example of widespread technological uses of 
copyrighted works without prior authorisation of rightholders. For instance, the Google 
search engine allows users to see cached versions of web pages included in search 
results. To that end, Google takes a snapshot of every web page as a backup in case the 
original page is not available. Those copies then become part of Google’s cache and are 
aimed to be used in cases when original web pages are not responding46. 
It is important to make a distinction between cached copies made and stored by Google 
as an internet service provider on its servers and temporary cached copies made and 
stored on a user’s computer. While the latter one was recently ruled to comply with a 
copyright exception under the Art. 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive47, the former activity is 
very controversial in this respect and seemingly cannot benefit from the same European 
exception. 
It may be a coincidence that Google was first time challenged in courts with respect to 
its cached web page copies both in Europe and the US in the same year of 2006. The 
factual backgrounds in two cases are also similar: a web page owner claimed a 
copyright infringement in making cached copies of their websites available through 
Google Search. 
                                               44 See Campbell case in terms of parody. 45 Karapapa & Borghi, 2013, p. 24. 46 Google. View web pages cached in Google Search Results. Available: <www.support.google.com/websearch/answer/1687222?hl=en> [2018, 25.11]. 47 See C-360/13, Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others [2014] EU:C:2014:1195. Available: <www.curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=153302&doclang=EN> [2018, 25.11]. 
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The US case involved a lawyer, Blake A. Field. He composed around fifty brief stories 
within few days, registered copyright in each of them, uploaded them to his website 
making them freely available online and then sued Google over cached copies of his 
works requesting $50,000 in statutory damages for each work48. Although having a bad 
faith character, it seemed to be a promising business model. However, the court 
dismissed Field’s claims on four separate grounds. The most relevant two are implied 
licence and the fair use. 
The implicit consent was inferred by the Court from the fact that Field knew how 
Internet search engines operate and could use the “no archive” Meta tag, or a robots.txt 
file, to ensure that Google does not display cached links to his pages49. This is an opt-
out mechanism that was discussed above, and, because the plaintiff did not take that 
measure, it was interpreted as the grant of a license to Google to make cached copies50. 
On the fair use account, the Court exempted Google from copyright liability with an 
argumentation that follows. The first fair use factor weighted well in Google’s favour 
because its presentation of cached links to the copyrighted works at issue served 
different functions than the original work, namely: a) it enabled users to access content 
when the original page was inaccessible; b) it allowed users to detect changes that had 
been made to a particular web page over time; c) it allowed users to understand why a 
page was responsive to their original query. 
The second fair use factor was found to weigh only slightly against the fair use. It is 
because even assuming that the works were creative, Field deliberately made them 
completely available for free to everyone. 
The third fair use factor was neutral, as it was necessary for Google to make entire 
copies of web pages to serve its transformative purposes. The Court remarked that even 
copying of entire works should not undermine a fair use finding where the function of 
the new use differs from the original. 
Finally, the fourth fair use factor strongly supported the finding of the fair use as there 
was no evidence that Google’s cached links had any impact on the potential market for 
Field’s copyrighted works. Field argued that the market for his works was harmed as he 
was deprived of potential revenue he could have obtained by licensing Google the right 
                                               48 Field v Google, 412 F Supp 2d 1106 (2006). 49 Ibid. p. 188. 50 See Field at 1116. 
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to make cached copies of his web pages. The Court, however, did not see any evidence 
of a market in which someone could license search engines the right to present cached 
links to web pages containing protected works, or evidence that such a market could 
develop in future. 
The EU case took place in Spain, where an owner of the website “www.megakini.com” 
claimed that Google violated her copyright by means of its cached links51. In particular, 
the plaintiff asserted two copyright infringement acts undertaken by Google: the short 
“snippet” below the link to her website in the search results page and reproducing and 
making available of a cached copy of the website via cached links. 
The court of first instance rejected that claims on the grounds of temporary reproduction 
exception (InfoSoc Directive) and safe harbour clause (e-Commerce Directive) 
transposed into the local Spanish law. The Court of Appeals upheld that ruling although 
on different grounds. In particular, short “snippets”, in the court’s view, were de 
minimis and, hence, non-infringing. However, the “cached” pages could find protection 
neither under the safe harbour nor under temporary reproduction exception.52 
Instead, the Court did something peculiar to find Google not liable in that case. The 
Court first asserted the need to use the three-step test53 in a fashion similar to the fair 
use doctrine: not only as a basis to define scopes of copyright exception but also as a 
guideline to determine limits of the concerned exclusive rights. With this in mind, the 
Court applied a Roman law principle ius usus innocui - the “right of using someone 
else’s property in a way that does not harm its owner, whose rationale is to prevent an 
overreaching protection of the owner’s right”54. 
In 2012 the Spanish Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the Appellate Court and 
also emphasised the need to revert to general principles of the law when considering 
cases which are not specifically regulated by statute55. Such principles may include, for 
example, good faith, prohibition of an abuse of rights and, lastly, ius usus innocui. 
                                               51 Lopez-Tarruella, 2012, p. 191 referring to the case Pedragosa v. Google Spain, S.L., Provincial Audience of Barcelona (Sec. 15), 17 Sept. 2008, WESTLAW AC 2008/1773. 52 Karapapa & Borghi, 2013, p. 41. 53 InfoSoc Directive, art. 5(5). 54 Lopez-Tarruella, 2012, p. 193. 55 Karapapa & Borghi, 2013, p. 42. 
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3.2.2. Thumbnails 
The second important kind of technological uses of copyrighted works that were 
challenged in courts involved reproduction of images - copied, reduced in size, stored 
and reproduced by search engines - mostly known under the name of “thumbnails”. The 
thumbnailing process essentially includes several steps: internet “crawlers” would make 
copies of original images, then computer software would use them to create small-sized 
copies (thumbnails) and, finally, copies of full-sized originals would be deleted. 
Thumbnails would be then stored on servers and presented in return to a search query. 
There were a number of cases assessing the legality of thumbnails and again it appeared 
to be a more difficult task for EU courts than for their US counterparts. Two most cited 
US rulings in the context of thumbnails came from Kelly v Arriba Soft56 and more 
recent Perfect 10 v Amazon57 case. Arriba Soft operated image search engine website 
and eventually was sued for a copyright infringement by a professional photographer, 
Leslie Kelly. 
The district court58 and later Ninth Circuit concluded that the contested use was a fair 
reproduction and thus non-infringing. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
function of Arriba’s images was different from the Kelly’s use because thumbnails were 
used to improve access to information on the internet. In addition, the Court emphasized 
that it is doubtful that someone would use low-quality thumbnailed images for 
illustrative or aesthetic purposes. Thus the Court concluded that because of serving a 
different purpose Arriba’s use was transformative59. 
The second case was similar to Kelly in respect of the use of thumbnails, however, the 
circumstances differed and led to a different ruling. Perfect 10 was in a business of 
serving adult magazines with pictures of nude models. The key difference from Kelly 
was that Perfect 10 licenced its pictures in reduced-size format to some third parties to 
be used on mobile phones. In other words, there was an existing market for small-sized 
pictures and the plaintiff claimed that Google’s thumbnails could be used as a 
substitution. This argument was taken by a district court as the main reason to deny fair 
use defence for Google. 
                                               56 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 57 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 58 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F.Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 59 Kelly, 336 F.3d, at 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling. It found that the use of thumbnails 
was actually a fair use60. As regards the market effect factor the Court stated that there 
was not enough evidence that any downloads of thumbnail images for mobile phone use 
had taken place via Google and, as a result, the potential market harm was just 
hypothetical61. 
In Europe, the use of thumbnails in search results was treated differently in the different 
Member States. Even within one jurisdiction courts lacked consistency in their 
approaches to how to decide on cases with similar factual circumstances. For a purpose 
of demonstration, this research refers to French and German rulings. 
In France, in a 2008 case - SAIF v. Google France and Google Inc - a French collective 
rights management society sued Google France and Google Inc. claiming illegal 
reproduction and display of thumbnail images in Google’s search results. A Paris court 
of first instance held that the applicable law, in this case, was the US law and thus 
applied the fair use doctrine to hold Google not liable for a copyright infringement.62 
The ruling, however, was appealed and consequently decided in a slightly different 
manner. The Court of Appeal found that actually a French law must be applied in this 
case; however, Google was still not liable on the grounds of safe harbour principle of 
the e-Commerce Directive transposed into a national law.63 
Interestingly, the Paris court of first instance took a different approach already in 2009 
in the case “H&K v. Google”64. In this case, a photographer Mr. André R. and his 
producer H&K brought a lawsuit against Google for unauthorised reproduction of their 
copyrighted images in thumbnails. This time, the court rejected Google’s claim about 
the US law applicability and found the reproduction in question infringing under the 
French copyright law. Moreover, the court also held that because Google’s thumbnail 
images lacked any reference to the original author it violated the author’s moral rights. 
Furthermore, the reduction in size per se, which is essential for making thumbnails, was 
found to infringe the right to the integrity of the work. 
                                               60 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d, at 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). 61 Ibid. 62 Lopez-Tarruella, 2012, p. 183. 63 Ibid., p. 184. 64 Ibid. 
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In Germany, thumbnails were embraced with more loyalty than in France, although no 
favouring copyright provision could be found there either. An exemplary case in this 
respect is known as “Vorschaubilder” (thumbnails) case. The plaintiff was an artist who 
had photographs of her paintings on her website. She filed a complaint against Google 
because Google displayed some of her pictures in form of thumbnails. Here the saga of 
courts’ interpretation began. 
The court of first instance dismissed the claim on the grounds of implied licence, similar 
to that in the US Field case. The Court of Appeal also dismissed the case, however, on 
the grounds of abuse of law. It rejected implied licence argument stating that mere 
publishing and making available of works on the Internet is not enough to infer implied 
licence. However, it concluded that the plaintiff abused her rights when suing Google 
because she set her website in a way that attracted Google’s crawlers (search engine 
optimization).65 
The German Federal Supreme Court reached yet different decision on this case66. It 
rejected the abuse of law theory and still held Google not liable. This time it was some 
kind of a simple consent that was found by the Court to exempt Google from liability. 
The Court explained that in principle Google’s thumbnailing process is a prima facie 
infringement and no copyright exception or limitation could cover it. The implied 
licence doctrine could not be invoked because the plaintiff asserted her copyright by a 
specific notice next to her pictures, meaning that she did not intend to allow any kind of 
unauthorised reproduction. 
The simple consent, that the Court invoked in this case, was inferred from the mere 
plaintiff’s behaviour that included posting pictures without prevention of internet 
crawlers and search engine optimization. This simple consent did not confer any rights 
on Google with respect to pictures in question but was enough to exempt it from a 
liability. To the Court, this consent can be revoked by the plaintiff anytime by means of 
website setting measures she can take to prevent crawlers from copying her pictures. 
3.2.3. Plagiarism detection 
Yet another example of technological uses of copyrighted works, that received some 
judicial review, is a well-known plagiarism detection service Turnitin. The service helps 
                                               65 Ibid., p. 185. 66 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) (German Federal Supreme Court) 29 April 2010, I ZR 69/08 
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to check the originality of a newly written work by comparing its text to other works 
previously uploaded to the Turnitin’s database. According to the publicly available 
information, this database comprises today of 62 billion of indexed web pages, 734 
million student papers and 160 million of scholarly journals and articles67. 
It is not hard to determine how Turnitin is actually building its database. Information 
from web pages must be copied by crawlers and stored on servers similarly to how 
Google search engine is caching web pages. At least in the US after Field, this activity 
does not really raise further copyright questions and is a clear fair use. Scholarly 
journals and articles are most probably licenced from respecting publishers and 
proprietary databases. 
As for student papers, the user agreement grants Turnitin a licence to use any uploaded 
student paper for a purpose of providing their services and improving quality of the 
services generally. The papers in question would be archived by default and stored in 
the database for an undefined period of time68. 
In fact, institutions may choose to not have their papers archived69 and students may 
request through their respecting educational institutions to have their works removed 
from the service’s archive70. Hereby some opt-out mechanism is available within 
Turnitin. However, it is hard to believe that any educational institution would choose to 
opt out from archiving since they are also interested in preventing copying from 
previous student’s works. Therefore, Institutions need all student works to be stored as a 
benchmark of originality. 
In 2006 few students in the US filed a lawsuit against the company that controlled the 
Turnitin website - iParadigms LLC. They claimed unlawful copying of their works to 
the Turnitin’s archive and demanded compensation. One of the students’ papers had a 
clear notice asking not to be used for archiving. 
The District Court rejected students’ claims on two grounds. Firstly, there was a 
contractual agreement between plaintiffs and defendant which entered into force when 
                                               67 Turnitin. The Leader in Preventing Plagiarism. Available: <www.turnitin.com/en_us/what-we-offer/feedback-studio> [2018, 30.04]. 68 Turnitin. User Agreement. Available at the registration page: <www.turnitin.com/newuser_join.asp?svr=316&session-id=e6fe8036dd13e223b12c5eecb120b9d0&lang=en_us&r=14.8462595622565> [2018, 25.11]. 69 Turnitin. Legal FAQ page: <www.turnitin.com/en_us/about-us/privacy#terms> [2018, 30.04]. 70 User Agreement. Supra note 68. 
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students clicked “I agree” under the user agreement before submitting their papers. In 
addition, the written notice against archiving was not considered to change the 
provisions of that contract. 
The second and most important in this analysis argument in favour of iParadigms was a 
fair use. The court concluded that the purpose of archiving works was to prevent 
plagiarism by comparative use and therefore it was transformative. In addition, the use 
in question could not in principle damage the market value of high school term papers 
and other such student works71. 
Plaintiffs appealed, claiming inter alia that the use could not be regarded transformative 
because it does not add anything new to their works. The Appeal Court, however, citing 
Perfect 10 case, asserted that “the use of a copyrighted work need not alter or augment 
the work to be transformative in nature. Rather, it can be transformative in function or 
purpose without altering or actually adding to the original work”72. 
3.2.4. Books digitization 
Starting from 2004 Google entered into an agreement with over 40 libraries around the 
world to obtain digital copies of their books and to make them available for an online 
search. According to agreements, Google would perform all the scanning-related work 
and libraries would retain an electronic copy of each digitized book as a reward for the 
access they provide. It looked like a win-win situation: libraries would get their 
collections digitized - otherwise costly undertaking that not every library can afford; 
and Google would obtain digital copies of books for their project with an investment 
they can actually afford to make. 
The ultimate goal of the project was to make books accessible through Google internet 
search. The result page would render some general information about the book, similar 
to that of library cards, and in addition: 
a) full-text view of out-of-copyright books and those, where permission was 
granted by respecting authors or publishers; 
b) limited preview with authors’/publishers’ permission; 
                                               71 AV et al. v iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (2008) 72 AV et al. v iParadigms, LLC, 562 Federal Reporter, 3d Series [2009], 630–647 (USA). 
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c) snippet view of few sentences to display user’s search term in context.73 
In 2005 the Authors Guild Association of America sued Google over so-claimed 
massive copyright infringement. In 2008 parties to the dispute reached a Settlement 
Agreement. The Agreement was not approved and in 2013 the District Court ruled in 
Google’s favour based on fair use74. 
The Authors Guild appealed in 2014 and in 2015 the Second Circuit Court supported 
the ruling in Google’s favour75. The Authors Guild requested a writ of certiorari from 
the Supreme Court asking to revise the appellate decision. The Supreme Court left the 
ruling unchanged in 2016 closing the dispute76. 
With respect to the fair use analysis, it is interesting to mention that the same judge 
Leval, who originally played a big role in developing this doctrine, provided his opinion 
in this case on the appellate stage. The transformativeness of Google Books, as part of 
the first factor, was found to be based on a different purpose that this service provides in 
comparison to that of original works. The Judge held that it is particularly 
transformative to make copies when the purpose is to enable search and identification of 
books that contain a term of searcher’s interests. Moreover, he stated that because of 
snippet view only allows seeing the frequency of the sought term appearing in the book, 
it makes the highly transformative search function even more valuable. 
As regards the second requirement, the nature of works did not preclude the finding of a 
fair use because Google Search provides information about the book, rather than 
“replicating protected expression in a manner that provides a meaningful substitute for 
the original”77. Similarly, judge Leval justified making entire copies of books: “it does 
not reveal that digital copy to the public”78. Entire copies are required to enable the 
search functions, and the snippet view is not significant enough to offer a competing 
substitute. Therefore Google also satisfies the third factor test. 
As for the fourth factor, the Judge recognised that the snippet function may cause some 
loss in sales of the original books. However, that is mainly attributable to interests not 
                                               73 Google. What you'll see when you search on Google Books. Available: <books.google.com/googlebooks/library/screenshots.html> [2018, 25.11]. 74 Authors Guild Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F.Supp.2d (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 75 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d (2d Cir. 2015). 76 Authors Guild, et al. v. Google, Inc., 15-849. 77 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d (2d Cir. 2015). 78 Ibid. 
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protected by copyright. A searcher may satisfy its demand in some factual information 
like a historical fact from a snippet view, but that information is not protected by 
copyright and the activity is thus noninfringing. 
In the course of discussing books digitization projects, it is also important to mention 
the case Authors Guild v HathiTrust79. The legal action, in this case, was filed and 
resolved in 2012 - long after the start of litigation against Google, but also before the 
Google Books was decided. Arguably, the ruling in HathiTrust favoured Goole’s 
position. 
HathiTrust is a partnership of main American research institutions and libraries aiming 
to ensure preservation and access to cultural works. Its repository comprises of public 
domain and copyrighted content from different sources like Google, the Internet 
Archive, Microsoft, and others80. 
Like Google, HathiTrust enabled full-text search of books, but, unlike Google, they also 
provided free access to books for people with print disabilities. Unsurprisingly, District 
Court and later Appellate body found the use of books for this purposes complying with 
fair use requirements. What is interesting in this case, the full access to digital copies of 
books for print-disabled people was not found to harm authors, because “the present-
day market for books accessible to the handicapped is so insignificant”81 that copyright 
holders normally do not even consider it as a source of revenue. To put it differently, 
the Court did not deny the existence of the market of works adapted for print-disabled 
people, it only held that it was not significant to harm. 
In Europe, courts embraced books digitization in a slightly different manner. In 2005 
Google was sued in France by a publishing group La Martiniere for an unauthorised 
reproduction of French books. In 2009 the Paris Court delivered its decision finding 
Google’s practices illegal82. Apart from claiming applicability of the US law, in the 
present case, Google also asserted that its conduct was complying with French 
copyright law. In particular, they argued that the snippet view of French books 
displayed in a Google Books search was consistent with French copyright exception 
permitting short quotations for informative purposes. 
                                               79 Authors Guild Inc v HathiTrust, No 11 Civ 6351 (HB), 2012 US Dist. 80 HathiTrust digital library website. Available: <www.hathitrust.org/> [2018, 25.11]. 81 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F. 3d 87 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2014. 82 Editions du Seuil et autres v Google Inc et France, Paris District Court, 3rd Chamber, 2nd Section, 79 PTCJ 226, 18 December 2009 (France). 
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However, the law requires some creative input on the part of a user and an aim to 
illustrate the subject matter of the original work. Hence, that argument was rejected by 
the court. In addition, the Court also held that Google Books violated authors’ right of 
integrity. Google representatives firstly planned to appeal that decision; however, they 
settled the dispute in 2011. It can be explained by very poor prospects to win that case 
in French copyright realities. 
Interestingly, a German publisher WBG together with the German Publishers 
Association sued Google over its Library Project nearly at the same time as the French 
one. However, they withdrew their claims shortly after they were told by the Copyright 
Chamber of the Regional Court of Hamburg that their legal action was unlikely to 
succeed83. It was said, that the Court decided to draw a comparison between the book’s 
short excerpts and snippets used in Google web search. However, it is not totally clear, 
what legal basis the German Court would apply to find such use not infringing 
copyright law. 
3.3. Case law summary comments 
An analysis of cases from Kelly to Google Books allows outlining some general judicial 
approach to technological uses of copyrighted works. That may help to envision 
possible future judicial treatment of uses that involve ML technologies in the US and 
Europe. 
To begin with, the first factor in the fair use analysis includes two seemingly unrelated 
components: first is a purpose and character of the use and, second is whether the use is 
commercial or not for profit. These two elements gained different decisive weight in the 
cases discussed here. 
The purpose and character of a secondary use have been always assessed in the light of 
transformativeness within a meaning of the famous formula from the judge Leval. It is 
needless to cite every court decision to demonstrate that every judge was stressing on a 
different purpose or function in assessing the first factor and finding the use non-
infringing. Hence, the functionality test found its direct application in all of the courts’ 
rulings. The different function of the use was enough to declare it transformative even 
                                               83 Google’s official blog 2006, June 28. Germany and the Google Books Library Project. Available: <www.googleblog.blogspot.fi/2006/06/germany-and-google-books-library.html> [2018, 25.11]. 
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in absence of any changes to original works. Consequently, it became one of the 
decisive factors in the whole analysis. 
It is important to discuss the role of commerciality as a part of the first factor. In fact, it 
is a lack of any significant role of this test in a fair use analysis that grabs attention. In 
particular, courts would conclude that commercial motivation cannot undermine the 
claim of fair use when the use itself is highly transformative84. This rule stems from the 
principle set down in the Campbell case, literally holding that “the more transformative 
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use”85. 
In the Second Circuit ruling on Google Books judge Leval held that “many of the most 
universally accepted forms of fair use, such as news reporting and commentary, 
quotation in historical or analytic books, reviews of books, and performances, as well 
as parody, are all normally done commercially for profit”86. It is in comfort with an 
interpretation that the very inclusion of a commerciality test in the statutory fair use 
provisions does not infer that commercial uses are presumptively unfair. However, this 
test may gain its relevance in cases where the secondary use lacks transformativeness in 
purpose. 
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, received limited attention in 
judicial assessment and never determinative. Thus for example, in Field, the nature of 
works weighted slightly against the finding of fair use. Similarly, it was only slightly in 
favour of the plaintiff in the Kelly case. 
Further, the bulk, entire and verbatim copying was normally assessed by courts within 
the third fair use factor, namely, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work. It is the scale of copying that amazed Authors Guild 
when they claimed a massive copyright infringement by Google. However, in none of 
the cases analysed here, this factor played any determinative role. Technological uses, 
based on web caching, make billions of web page copies. Google scanned millions of 
books in their entirety including cover pages. Yet these factors alone were neglected in 
courts. 
                                               84 Authors Guild, et al. v. Google, Inc., 15-849. 85 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 86 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d (2d Cir. 2015). 
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Consequently, neither the nature of a work nor amount of the use would prevent courts 
from finding a fair use in cases of technological uses. This outcome suggests that the 
mere fact that ML requires a large number of highly creative works would not matter at 
all in finding this activity non-infringing. 
There has been some controversy around the fourth fair use factor, namely the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. It becomes 
understandable when thinking about any secondary use of a copyrighted work as a 
derivative use. From this perspective, plaintiffs tend to claim that almost any new use of 
their work is part of an unexplored derivative market87. Indeed, following a broad 
concept of a derivative work, it is possible to assume that everything is a potential 
market effect. 
In order to preserve the functionality of the fair use doctrine and bring some clarity into 
the potential market concept, courts adopted some guiding rules. First, “the market for 
potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in 
general develop or license others to develop”88. Thus in Field, the Court could not 
identify any existing licensing market for making cached links to web pages with 
protected works, neither it found evidence that it would develop in future. 
Second, the important limitation laid down in Campbell case and referred to in Google 
Books and HathiTrust suggests that “the market harm analysis is concerned with only 
one type of economic injury to a copyright holder - the harm that results from the 
secondary use serving as a substitute for the original work”89. In other words, any 
market harm resulted from secondary transformative uses that do not serve as 
substitutes for the original work normally would not count in courts. 
Third, the market harm claimed by plaintiffs must be cognizable under copyright. To be 
more specific, if there is any negative effect on the market or on the potential market of 
a copyrighted work occurs, it must be examined whether that harm results from a use 
that is under the exclusive right of a copyright owner. To put it differently, if the harm 
derives from a use which is not protected by copyright, that market effect will normally 
be not considered in court. 
                                               87 Sag, 2009, p. 43. 88 Campbell at 569. 89 Matulionyte, R. 2016, “10 years for Google Books and Europeana: copyright law lessons that the EU could learn from the USA”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, vol. 24, no. 1, p 59. 
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For example, in Google Books judge Leval argued that some loss in sales may occur 
because users would satisfy their search for a historical fact from a snippet view. It is 
also possible to assume that authors would like to develop a market for information 
about their books and license it to search engines. However, that kind of market harm 
“will generally occur in relation to interests that are not protected by the copyright”90. 
Fourth, argumentation of Leval also suggests that the magnitude of market harm matters 
as well. It must be meaningful or significant to matter91. Similarly, in HathiTrust the 
court emphasised that, if the existing licensing market for uses in question is very 
insignificant (like in case with books adapted for print-disabled), it will not be 
considered by courts as sufficient92. 
Finally, as it was mentioned in the introduction to the fair use doctrine, apart from the 
known four criteria courts sometimes assess other factors like a public benefit of a 
secondary use. Some commentators and judges refer to it as a fifth fair use factor. 
Indeed, in Kelly, the court emphasised that search engines “benefit the public by 
enhancing information-gathering techniques on the internet”93. Later, the same 
argument was raised in the Field case. In Perfect 10, Google was praised for a public 
benefit that search engines provide by using an original work into a new work as an 
electronic reference tool94. In iParadigms, the court stressed on “a substantial public 
benefit through the network of educational institutions using Turnitin”95. Lastly, in 
Google Books, the District Court judge Denny Chin dedicated a separate section in its 
decision called “The benefits of the Library Project and Google Books” and discussed 
how useful this service is for an information society. 
The requirement of public benefit can be traced back to the Campbell case when judge 
Leval held that the fair use factors should be considered in light of the purpose of 
copyright which is namely “the Progress of Science and Useful Arts”. The established 
case law thus may suggest, that the more the secondary use contributes to the progress 
of science and useful arts, the more it adds to the finding of fair use. It shall be wrong 
                                               90 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 224 (2d Cir. 2015). 91 Ibid. 92 HathiTrust, 755 F3d 87, 23–24. 93 See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820. 94 Perfect 10, at 1165. 95 AV et al. v iParadigms, LLC, 562 Federal Reporter, 3d Series [2009], 630–647. 
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though to imply that a lack of public benefit may undermine the defendant’s position 
because it is not a mandatory requirement of the doctrine as it is codified in law. 
Moreover, some argue that courts are not always the right place to determine to what 
extent or whether at all some new emerging technology is of benefit to the public, as it 
is especially unclear at that early stage96. There is always a danger that a judge will not 
fully recognize the ultimate value of the system in question and hamper its further 
development. As it was once rightly articulated, “the copyright law can make or break 
emerging technologies...”97 
As regards the EU copyright, there is no uniform approach on how to treat unauthorised 
technological uses of the kind discussed here. There is simply no suitable EU copyright 
exception that could cover those uses that are deemed to be fair in the US. 
Some courts, in order to avoid hampering technological progress, would choose to 
apply the US law where it is possible. Other courts, for example in Spain, would revert 
to general principles such as ius usus innocui. However, this latter approach does not 
seem to be a reliable solution for technological use challenges. It is rather a last resort 
for courts to protect legitimate interests in the absence of specific copyright rules. 
As can be seen, the copyright exception for a temporary reproduction prescribed by the 
InfoSoc Directive also cannot cover most of the technological uses, such as thumbnails 
and cached copies of web pages. For instance, the kind of caching in the Spanish 
Google Cache case is different from the one mentioned in the Recital 33 of the InfoSoc 
Directive98. For the search engine to function effectively, it is not essential to have a 
cached copy of a website, especially when the original source was deleted or changed 
over time. 
In addition, courts, in general, refuse to apply an implied licence doctrine to the content 
uploaded on the Internet. A too broad interpretation of an implied consent would 
contravene with a general opt-in principle, meaning that a specific consent must be 
sought prior to making any copy of protected works. A German alternative innovation 
                                               96 Reese, A. 2005, “The Problems of Judging Young Technologies: A Comment on Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer”, Case Western Reserve Law Review 55 (2005) 877, 887. 97 Sobel, 2017, pp. 5 and 33. 98 Recital 33 of the InfoSoc Directive: “...this exception should include acts which enable browsing as well as acts of caching to take place, including those which enable transmission systems to function efficiently...” 
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of a simple consent concept in the Vorschaubilder case99, just like the Spanish ius usus 
innocui principle, seems to be too vague to serve a reliable copyright exemption 
function. 
Consequently, the European case law demonstrates that the different EU Member States 
treat technological uses of copyrighted works differently. Spain and Germany would 
find some other than copyright rules to protect interests that seem to be legitimate from 
a general law principles perspective. France, in contrast, would stick to a narrow 
copyright law interpretation and forbid uses that in most countries would be regarded as 
lawful. 
It can be explained by two main reasons. The first one is an outdated EU copyright law. 
The last attempt to modernize copyright rules adapting them to new technologies was 
undertaken in 2001 InfoSoc Directive. Already in 2006 Google was challenged in court 
for its cached copies of web pages and could not rely on any copyright exception 
introduced in the Directive. Certainly, a rapid development of new technologies requires 
the law to follow up accordingly. 
The second reason could be a lack of harmonization of copyright rules between the EU 
Member States. Although the InfoSoc Directive was aimed to bring closer varied 
national copyright laws, most of the exceptions had an optional character meaning its 
voluntary implementation. Moreover, Member States were also granted some degree of 
national discretion in implementing the Directive’s rules. 
Apart from the need to update the EU copyright law with some mandatory technological 
copyright exceptions, there could be also an alternative solution to the described 
copyright issue. It is a possibility to invoke fundamental human freedoms as a limitation 
mechanism to far-reaching exclusive rights, what both ECtHR and CJEU stressed upon 
for multiple times100. 
Copyright as an element of an intellectual property must be respected and protected 
under the Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(hereinafter the EU Charter). However, that protection must be balanced against the 
                                               99 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) (German Federal Supreme Court) 29 April 2010, I ZR 69/08. 100 For more analysis on the intersection of human rights and intellectual property See in general Geiger, C (ed.) 2015, Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Edward Elgar Publishing, Incorporated, Cheltenham. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [2018, 25.11]. 
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protection of other fundamental rights, such as e.g. the right to freedom of expression 
and information guaranteed by the Article 11 of the EU Charter. 
For instance, it could be argued that Google’s cached copies of web pages allow users 
to access information in times when it is no longer available, to compare changes on the 
web page and understand why the page was responsive to their search. It is an 
undisputed fact that analysing cached copies of web pages is a particularly useful tool 
for investigative journalists101. Therefore, this Google caching function could have great 
prospects of finding legality under the freedom of expression and information if duly 
assessed by courts in that fashion. Apparently, in 2012 the Spanish Supreme Court did 
not consider this way of reasoning and had to rely on general principles of law instead.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
                                               101 Chavez, S. , 10 Google tools investigative reporters can use to find information. Available: <www.ijnet.org/en/story/10-google-tools-investigative-reporters-can-use-find-information> [2018, 05.12]. 
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4. PROSPECTS OF MACHINE LEARNING USES IN THE 
US 
Why robots get for free something that humans have to pay for?102 
4.1. The input reproduction assessment 
Assessing legality of unauthorised uses of copyrighted works for Machine Learning 
purposes, relying solely on the existing case law, does not seem to be that 
straightforward task. The complication inherently comes from differences in how 
copyrighted works are used. 
All of the cases discussed in the previous chapter dealt with uses that include partial 
(e.g. snippet view) or complete (e.g. cached copies of web pages) demonstration of 
original works to the public, although serving a completely different purpose by doing 
so. At the same time, ML uses do not intend to make any display of the original 
expression. However, the possibility of such display shall not be disregarded. 
This study will further analyse separately two categories of reproductions associated 
with ML uses. The first group of reproductions takes place when original works are 
initially copied and then analysed as a part of a training dataset in order to discover 
important patterns. It would be correct to refer to this kind of copying as a non-display 
use because they do not display any part of original works to the public. These 
reproductions take place only due to an automation factor involved in the process of 
analysis of a vast amount of information. 
The second kind of reproductions is relevant for the final outcome produced by ML 
models. It is not, however, always a case that those reproductions will take place, but 
since an expressive AI model is meant to create new images or generate human-like 
language, some similarities with original copyrighted input might occur. 
For the first time, non-display uses gained its copyright relevance from the rejected 
settlement agreement in the Google Books case. According to the Agreement, “Non-
Display Uses” meant “uses that do not display expression from digital copies of books 
or inserts to the public. For example, display of bibliographic information, full-text                                                102 The fair use discourse in the US often culminates over the unsettling fact that while humans have to pay for a copy of protected work, making same copy for computational analysis (computer readership) may be exempted from a copyright infringement. 
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indexing without display of expression, algorithmic listings of key terms for chapters of 
books, and internal research and development using digital copies are all non-display 
uses”103. 
While the “Non-Display Uses” term is rather broad, the “Non-Consumptive Research” 
is more specific and meant “research in which computational analysis is performed on 
one or more books, but not research in which a researcher reads or displays substantial 
portions of a book to understand the intellectual content presented within the book”104. 
Thus, the latter one seems to be covered by the former one and, according to the 
Agreement, it includes such uses as analysis of images and texts, extraction of 
information, automated translation, linguistic analysis, and others. 
If approved, the Agreement would permit Google to conduct non-display uses without 
prior authorisation of authors. However, the only fact that the Agreement was not 
approved by the Court does not mean that Google would refrain itself from a temptation 
to do just that with the database of books it has compiled. 
In this regard, Pamela Samuelson suggested, that Google would likely continue non-
display uses of books even if the Agreement failed. She opined, that “non-display 
uses ... would likely result in advancing knowledge and/or in the creation of new 
noninfringing works of authorship, such as new tools to aid in the translation of texts 
from one language to another”105. To her, because these uses do not demonstrate any 
protected expression to public “they are unlikely to bring about any harm or potential 
harm to the market for the underlying works”106. 
In the way of example, in 2016 researchers at Google used 11 000 novels to train an AI-
based Smart Reply function of their email services. The aim was to improve the 
program’s ability to “generate coherent novel sentences” and thus to upgrade Smart 
Reply’s conversational skills107. In this case, Google seemingly did not take a risk to use 
books from its own database. The training data originated from a different source.                                                103 Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild v Google, Case No 05 CV 8136-DC, 13 November 2009, § 1.94. 104 Ibid. § 1.93. 105 Samuelson, P. 2010, “Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace”, (2010) 94(5) Minnesota Law Review. P. 1363 (footnote 280). 106 Ibid. 107 Bowman, S.R. et al. 2016, May 12, Generating Sentences from a Continuous Space, arXiv 1. Available: <www.arxiv.org/abs/1511.06349> [2018, 25.11]; Kantrowitz, A. 2016, May 5, Google Is Feeding Romance Novels To Its Artificial Intelligence Engine To Make Its Products More Conversational, BUZZFEED, available: <www.buzzfeed.com/alexkantrowitz/googles-artificial-intelligence-engine-reads-romance-novels.> [2018, 25.11]. 
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However, it turned out that at least some of the novels were copied without the consent 
of respecting rightholders. In fact, novels were available for a free download, but under 
the licence “for your personal enjoyment only”108. 
A Google spokesman asserted that when the ML research is conducted on free e-books 
“it doesn’t harm the authors and is done for a very different purpose from the authors’, 
so it’s fair use under US law”109. This argument is to some extent echoing with words of 
Samuelson, but with one very important difference. While both suggestions emphasise 
on the absence of any harm to authors of original works, Samuelson asserts, it is 
because of the non-display character of the secondary use, and Google spokesperson 
attributes it to the fee-free nature of the works in question. 
The concept of harm proved to be one of the decisive factors in the fair use analysis of 
technological uses. Samuelson directs our attention to a more fundamental rationale that 
if a reproduction of a work does not communicate its protected expression to the public, 
authors will not suffer any harm from such use and therefore it must be deemed lawful. 
From this perspective, it shall not really matter whether the books were offered for 
download free of charge or for pay. It is only an act of displaying original expression to 
others that is protected by copyright. 
In the context of the Smart Reply research example, Sobel rightly mentioned, that 
Google could train a brilliant, expressive AI using its entire Google Books library 
containing millions of electronic copies of books110. However, unlike providing 
information about the books, which is not restricted by copyright, training AI intends to 
harvest “authors’ varied and rich expression of ideas” which is a very “essence of 
copyrightable subject matter”111. 
Nevertheless, if Smart Reply function does not replicate original expressions of the 
training datasets, the mere act of analysing that expression shall not lead to a copyright 
infringement. Moreover, as the cases dealing with thumbnails and snippets 
demonstrated, even use of protected expression by displaying it can be fair if it is done 
for a different purpose (functionality test) like it is also the case with the Smart Reply. 
                                               108 Lea, R. 2016, Google Swallows 11,000 Novels to Improve AI’s Conversation, The Guardian, available: <www.theguardian.com/books/2016/sep/28/google-swallows-11000-novels-to-improve-ais-conversation> [2018, 25.11]. 109 Ibid. 110 Sobel, 2017, pp. 23-24. 111 Ibid. 
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It is interesting to point out, that in the Google Books case most of the debate was 
focusing on the uses that included a partial display of those books, while one type of use 
was not objected by the plaintiff. Moreover, it was even praised by the judge. 
In particular, judge Denny Chin, in the course of highlighting benefits of the Google 
Books project, mentioned that “Google Books greatly promotes a type of research 
referred to as “data mining” or “text mining”112. The judge here meant a Google Books 
Ngram Viewer113 - an online service that allows users to conduct research on the 
massive amount of books. The tool simply renders a graph illustrating how those 
phrases were used in books over a selected period of time114. 
The common feature of the Ngram Viewer tool and the Smart Reply function is that 
neither of them is meant to reproduce the author’s original expression. The first one is 
more obvious because it only provides statistical information about a search term. It 
counts words and returns a number. The latter one is more intricate in this sense because 
it analyses human expression to produce another human-like expression. 
In the context of technological uses, some commentators focused on expressive and 
non-expressive use classification. The line of cases from Kelly to Google Books dealt 
with instances of “copying expressive works for non-expressive ends”115 and the Ngram 
Viewer is exactly that type of use. However, with the progress in ML, it is time to assess 
the copying of expressive works for highly transformative and innovative expressive 
ends. Can non-display technological expressive use of copyrighted works invoke fair 
use defence, provided that the secondary expression is distinct from the original one? 
As it was discussed in the previous section, technological uses of copyrighted works 
would normally be tested against transformativeness, market effect, and public benefit 
factors. The study will now address each of them in the context of expressive ML uses 
and try to create some guiding principles towards finding a fair use. 
First of all, ML uses employ copyrighted works in a completely different manner and 
for a completely different purpose than the original use. On the account of the different 
manner, a computer program does not read a work, let’s say a book, in a way that 
humans would do it. It is also more evident that computers do not perceive an image in                                                112 Authors Guild Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F.Supp.2d (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 113 Google. Ngram Viewer, available: <books.google.com/ngrams> [2018, 25.11]. 114 Google. What does the Ngram Viewer do? Available: <books.google.com/ngrams/info> [2018, 25.11]. 115 Sag, 2009, p. 3. 
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the same way as humans. Similarly, the purpose of human reading typically would be to 
enjoy an original author’s expressions or retrieve some useful information. For ML, in 
contrast, it is a discovery of unique patterns in the process of building an AI model. 
Some may argue, that at least in some cases machines do not do more with copyrighted 
works than humans would do. A quick example may be a text mining to extract some 
valuable information. Exempting machine “reading” from a copyright infringement 
would encourage humans to outsource their reading to computers116. 
However, the scale of machine processing outreaches human reading possibilities in 
countless times. Furthermore, greater possibilities are not simply in a greater number of 
works that computer would process. Some value can be extracted only when a large 
number of works is being combined together. That is what some call a “collective 
intelligence of a large digital library”117. That intelligence might never be accessible 
within reach of human reading capabilities. Hence, the purpose just like a manner of the 
use would differ dramatically from a traditional original use. 
Applying language of the judge Leval, ML would use copyrighted works “as raw 
material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights 
and understandings...”118 Hence courts should not find it difficult to conclude on a 
highly transformative nature of such uses. 
In the market effect analysis, it is necessary first to identify whether such a market 
exists or is likely to develop. This question may appear more controversial than it seems 
to be. From a first sight, it is hard to spot any signs of such a market mainly because 
writers do not write books with an anticipation to get royalties from licensing their 
works to AI developers. The same implication applies to other fields of artistic creation 
as well. 
Nevertheless, without prejudice to its effectiveness, it is possible to argue, that some 
market for training data already exists119. For example, Elsevier120 offers its large 
volumes of publications for text and data mining, encourages ML application to “turn 
                                               116 Grimmelmann, 2016, p. 674. 117 Karapapa & Borghi, 2013, p. 49. 118 Leval, 1990, p. 1111. 119 Sobel, 2017, p. 27. 120 Originally a publishing company that now positions itself as an information and analytics company. Provider of scientific, technical, and medical information publications. Available: <www.elsevier.com/> [2018, 25.11]. 
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data into knowledge”121. While it is a great place to conduct some scientific research, it 
might not be suitable for training expressive AI models, since its database is limited 
only to scientific, technical and medical information. 
Other examples of the potential market of training data are internet platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and Google etc. They aggregate user-generated content, subject to 
intellectual property protection under “a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, 
royalty-free and worldwide licence to host, use, distribute, modify, run, copy, publicly 
perform or display, translate and create derivative works of [users’] content”122. That 
content in pictures, videos, sounds etc. is potentially useful in ML projects. 
Indeed, in their Data Policy Facebook says “we … provide information and content to 
research partners and academics to conduct research that advances scholarship and 
innovation that supports our business or mission ...”123 However, this formulation 
implies that the content can be used only in relation to a research that supports 
Facebook’s business or mission, which is by itself a significant constraint for 
independent research entities pursuing their own goals. Therefore, it is not offered for 
anyone for their research purposes. 
An interesting recent example of using content from social internet platforms is a 
research directed to develop an AI model able to generate poetry from images124. They 
used two datasets in the research. To build the first one they crawled content from 
groups in Flickr that use images illustrating poems. The second one was a large poem 
corpus crawled from websites dedicated to poetry, such as Poetry Foundation125, 
PoetrySoup126, “best-poem.net” and “poets.org”. 
As a rule, scraping content from internet platforms by means of web crawlers would be 
prohibited by terms of use, except as otherwise expressly permitted127. On the one hand, 
it is not known whether permissions were obtained in this particular project. On another 
hand, social media platforms do not explicitly offer their content for this kind of                                                121 Elsevier. These Elsevier collaborations use machine learning to turn data into knowledge. Available: <www.elsevier.com/connect/these-elsevier-collaborations-use-machine-learning-to-turn-data-into-knowledge> [2018, 25.11]. 122 Facebook. Terms of services: <www.facebook.com/terms.php> [2018, 25.11]. 123 Facebook. Data Policy. How is this information shared? Available: <www.facebook.com/about/privacy> [2018, 25.11]. 124 Liu, B. et al. 2018, “Beyond Narrative Description: Generating Poetry from Images by Multi-Adversarial Training”, arXiv. Available: <www.arxiv.org/abs/1804.08473> [2018, 25.11]. 125 Poetry Foundation website: <www.poetryfoundation.org/> [2018, 25.11]. 126 PoetrySoup website: <www.poetrysoup.com/> [2018, 25.11]. 127 For example Flickr’s terms of use. Available: <www.flickr.com/help/terms> [2018, 25.11]. 
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analysis. There is simply no information available about such services and it is only 
possible to assume that requests could be negotiated individually. 
Consequently, the aggregation of content within separate holders, like publishers or 
internet platforms, suggests that some market for training data already exists and other 
markets could develop in the future. However, those opportunities available today fall 
short of satisfying demands of researchers in the field of creative AI. Internet platforms 
engage in mining content and developing AI models for their own commercial 
purposes, rather than offering their great databases for every interested party. That could 
be explained by the need to preserve a competitive advantage in the race of AI research 
and weights against the development of a meaningful and functional market. 
Therefore, the current state of affairs with a market of training data for ML suggests that 
a potential harm to respecting rightholders is unlikely to be sufficient to preclude the 
finding of the fair use. As the court in HathiTrust pointed out, even if some market for 
the use in question exists but it is very insignificant, it shall not amount to sufficient 
harm to the market of original works128. 
As regards the impact of the secondary use on the traditional market of that copyrighted 
works, it is important to remember, that only harm caused by secondary use serving as a 
substitute for the original work would be considered as relevant in the fair use analysis. 
With a high degree of certainty, it can be argued, that AI-generated works would be 
different enough or used in a different way to avoid any substitution claim. 
First of all, secondary works would be new original creations. Similarly to new human-
created works they would be capable of competing with original works. Substitution is 
principally different from a competition. Creating substitution means competing with 
original authors in their own expression and is restricted by copyright. In contrast, 
competition in a new different expression is normally encouraged by copyright law. The 
principle “on the shoulders of giants” should apply equally to human and machine 
creations after all. 
Some scholars argue, that creative AI “not only jeopardizes the market for the works on 
which it is trained, it also threatens to marginalize authors completely”129. The threat 
comes from a possible, and at least partial, automation of the creative industry. 
                                               128 HathiTrust, 755 F3d 87, 23–24. 129 Sobel, 2017, p. 30. 
43 
Unrestricted creative AI could produce works at little or no cost oversupplying market 
with cheaper content. Arguably, it may discourage human authors to create in such new 
circumstances. As the result, a doctrine that promotes computer authorship and deprives 
humans of incentives to create looks inconsistent with what copyright law was 
originally meant to achieve. 
Automation or “AI-ization” of some aspects of human activities is inevitable and has 
already started, including the field of creative industry. Naturally, it may lead to some 
human professional groups losing their traditional markets and sources of income. One 
recent example is an AI model called Bayou that can write actual computer code130. It is 
claimed to be a significant breakthrough in the chain of attempts to develop a computer 
program able to code another computer programs. If further developed, it can disrupt 
the industry and oust human programming or at least alter it to a great degree. 
Another danger of creative AI is that it could be used to appropriate author’s artistic 
personality. As it was pointed out, authors risk to “lose control over their own 
expressive personality, as embedded in their works”131. The possibility of such artistic 
identity theft is more realistic than imaginative. The example of The Next Rembrandt 
demonstrates the technological potential to analyse an entire collection of one author 
and then create a new work mimicking an original artistic style. 
With AI capabilities it would be possible to create a digital avatar that would generate 
new works following particular artistic patterns contained in previous works of an artist. 
In the positive scenario, authors could utilise this technology for their own benefit to 
generate subsequent creations. It would be enough to create a personal distinguishable 
style and then outsource it to AI to do the rest. 
In the case of artistic identity theft, a traditional analysis of a copyright infringement 
may not always apply because it is a style and not original expression that is being 
copied. Therefore it might be impossible to establish any reproduction in part or in 
whole. At the same time, interests of the author who fall victim to AI avatar would be 
affected. It may cause significant market harm and also reputational losses. 
However, in the same manner, as with negative effects of the AI-zation, a potential 
harm to rightholders’ markets, in this case, would derive from an activity not restricted 
                                               130 What is Bayou: <info.askbayou.com/> [2018, 25.11]. 131 Sartor, G. et al. 2018, “The Use of Copyrighted Works by AI Systems: Art Works in the Data Mill”. Available at SSRN: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=3264742> [2018, 25.11]. P. 12. 
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by copyright law. So it should have no meaning for the fair use discussion. Moreover, 
as the Sony Betamax case also illustrated132, when there are legal uses of a technology in 
place, the mere possibility that someone will misuse it for a wrongdoing should not 
hamper the development of that technology. 
After all, current copyright law does not yet grant protection to AI-generated works. 
Hence, while fair use may give AI more possibilities to create, humans are in a better 
position with respect to protecting their creations. Although developing two different 
legal systems for machines and humans133 entails a number of associated problems, e.g. 
ensuring that a work was written by human and not by AI, the very idea to deprive AI-
generated works of copyright protection seems to be an adequate price for a facilitated 
access to copyrighted works. It must be remembered though, that the future of 
copyrightability of AI-generated works is far from being certain. 
The public benefit of creative AI can be approached from two perspectives: first, it is a 
public utility of a specific AI model trained on copyrighted content and; second, a 
progress of science in general, which stems from new discoveries in the field of 
computer science. 
The level of public utility will vary from model to model depending on the specific 
practical application. For instance, a sophisticated AI-based online tool generating 
translations indistinguishable from human-made, or some reliable AI model able to 
generate new computer code would be of great public benefit. At the same time, the 
public utility of some other applications, e.g. the Prisma App kind, could still be 
questioned. 
On the account of the progress of science and useful arts that copyright law is aimed to 
promulgate, it is clear enough that greater access to training data would foster 
advancements in the field of AI. Therefore it would be a strong argument in a potential 
assessment of the so-called fifth fair use factor. 
                                               132 In Sony Betamax the use of timeshifting video cassette recorders was found legal regardless the fact that they could be used to create infringing copies of TV broadcasted videos. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 133 Grimmelmann (2016) in this respect notes: “We have created a two-tracked copyright law: one for human readers and one for robots. Uses involving human readers receive close and exacting scrutiny to make sure that no market belonging to the copyright owner is being preempted. Uses involving robotic readers are fast-tracked for fair use”, p. 667. 
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4.2. Reproduction in the output 
Fortunately, the US copyright has developed a solid case law dealing with copying of 
creative elements of one work into another. It would go beyond of the objectives of this 
paper to discuss into details elements of the classical copyright infringement case 
analysis. However, it is worth pointing out specific features of applying existing 
doctrines to ML cases. 
First of all, it is always necessary to prove that a claimed copying actually took place. 
That can be done, inter alia, by demonstrating that a defendant had access to the 
original work of a plaintiff. While it may be a tricky task in a case with human creators, 
it normally would require a mere inspection of a training dataset in the case of ML use. 
Further, the well discussed fair use doctrine can also apply to some cases of 
reproduction in the outcome. As it was emphasised before, even literal copying of 
original works in part or in whole and its subsequent demonstration to the public may 
find its protection under the fair use doctrine, provided that the use is highly 
transformative. The functionality test may find its best application in cases involving 
AI-generated works. 
Just like the use of copyrighted images in thumbnails was recognised a transformative 
in purpose, an AI-generated work might also serve a different purpose from the original 
one. For instance, the use of an original expression in translations is quite different from 
the use in a literary work. Another, more coherent example may be the aforementioned 
Prisma App. The application uses some original expression from different works like 
paintings or videos in a totally different way - as a style of a particular photo editing 
filter. 
ML uses may offer various innovative ways to reuse pre-existing copyrighted works 
that would be found highly transformative. The transformativeness of a secondary use 
would normally add to another important fair use factor - a market harm element. The 
more transformative use is - the less effect it would have on the market of original 
works. 
Even in situations where a secondary use can hardly be recognised transformative and 
therefore not compatible with fair use requirements, a defendant still may avoid 
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copyright infringement claims when the amount of borrowed expression is trivial. That 
is very likely in cases of incidental reproductions. 
In particular, according to the de minimis doctrine in the US, in order to establish 
infringement, the secondary use must exceed a trivial level. The US copyright law “does 
not concern itself with trifles”134. The doctrine has long applied to various copyrighted 
subject matters and only recently its reach was extended also to sound recordings135. 
Therefore, AI-generated music, by analogy with samplings, in some cases may excuse 
the act of copying, provided that it is not significant in quantity and quality.  
                                               134 Mezei, P. 2017, “De Minimis and Artistic Freedom: Sampling on the Right Track?”, Jagiellonian University Intellectual Property Law Review, vol. 139, no. 1/2018, footnote 4, p. 2., citing Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (1997), p. 74. 135 See TufAmerica, Inc., v. WB Music Corp., et. al., 67 F.Supp.3d 590 (2014) and VMG Salsoul, LLC, v. Madonna Louise Ciccone, et. al., 824 F.3d 871 (2016). 
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5. PROSPECTS OF MACHINE LEARNING USES IN THE 
EU 
Why robots have to pay for something that humans can do for free?136 
5.1. TDM copyright exception for the input copying 
5.1.1. TDM term and its legal framework 
As it became clear above, European copyright law is a system of exceptions and 
limitations. In the absence of a clear copyright rule that would allow a use of 
copyrighted materials for a specific purpose, the legality of such uses would be always 
associated with uncertainty. That is exactly the case with uses of copyrighted works for 
machine learning purposes in Europe. 
The situation, however, is about to change with an ongoing copyright reform. In 
particular, the reform intends to introduce a copyright exception for text and data 
mining (TDM) purposes. Since all the copyright discussion within the EU operates the 
term TDM, it is important to establish a connection between TDM and ML to 
understand whether and how copyright exception for the first one will affect the second 
one. Therefore, the research will next discuss the meaning of the TDM term and how it 
corresponds to ML and then analyse the current legal status of such activities in the EU. 
According to the draft Copyright Directive proposed by the European Commission 
(hereinafter Proposal), TDM is defined as “any automated analytical technique aiming 
to analyse text and data in digital form in order to generate information such as 
patterns, trends and correlations”137. However, this definition shall not be 
misunderstood as limited only to text and data. As the recital 8 of the Proposal explains, 
TDM generally shall be viewed as “the automated computational analysis of 
information in digital form, such as text, sounds, images or data”138. In other words, the 
subject matter of the TDM can be any copyrighted material. 
                                               136 The TDM discourse in Europe often narrows down to the point, that once a lawful access to copyrighted materials is provided, humans can freely analyse that content - the same must apply also when analysis is done by computer. 137 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market, 14 September 2016, COM(2016) 593 final, 2016/0280 (Text with EEA relevance). Art. 2(2). 138 Ibid., Recital 8. 
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Furthermore, words construction “any automated analytical technique” suggests that 
there may be many ways to conduct this computational analysis of information. Indeed, 
the FutureTDM project, an organization aiming to foster the use of TDM in the EU139, 
provides information about different methods used in TDM analysis140. The list by now 
includes 29 methods, among which are Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Text 
Mining, Data Mining, Deep Learning, and others. 
So as it appears, the Commission defines TDM in a rather broad fashion. It is limited 
neither to text and data as subject matters, nor it is limited to text mining and data 
mining as methods of computational analysis. ML shall be regarded as one of the 
methods of TDM. Therefore, the new exception will be applicable also to acts of 
analysing materials for the ML purposes. 
Although the last statement holds true, the relationship between two terms shall not be 
viewed as a part and a whole. The TDM term does not cover all activities associated 
with ML. Neither ML enfolds the TDM term completely. The acts of analysing a vast 
amount of data lie in the intersection of those two terms and are particularly relevant for 
this study. ML may go further after the computational analysis and pattern recognition 
stage to e.g. apply acquired insights into a new context, but that would go beyond the 
scopes of TDM. 
Under such circumstances, it is necessary to analyse the newly proposed TDM 
exception as a potential legal justification for using copyrighted materials on the input 
stage in ML. The thesis will next mostly refer to the TDM term accordingly. 
It is worth mentioning that the Study on the legal framework of text and data mining141, 
conducted on the request of the Commission, suggested referring to “data analysis” 
rather than to “text and data mining” in a future legislative intervention. It was argued, 
that the definition of text and data mining must be “technology-neutral, evolutive and 
made for changing technologies”142. 
                                               139 About the FutureTDM Project. Available: <www.futuretdm.eu/news/about-futuretdm/> [2018, 25.11]. 140 TDM Methods. Available: <www.futuretdm.eu/method-list/> [2018, 25.11]. 141 Triaille, J.et al. 2014, Study on the legal framework of text and data mining, European Commission. Available: <www.dx.doi.org/10.2780/1475> [2018, 25.11]. 142 Ibid., p. 9. 
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It was also emphasised that “to mine” means “to extract data from texts qua 
informational resources”143, while “data analysis” covers a larger number of processes 
than the mere extraction of data. Furthermore, to mine content means to go deep into the 
mined subject matter, while some data analysis techniques stay on the surface of that 
content144. 
It is particularly true in regard to the web crawling technologies that often simply copy 
the content for caching purposes. As it was illustrated in third chapter, European courts 
have difficulties with cases involving copying for web caching needs. Therefore, use of 
the “data analysis” term could go beyond of discovering knowledge and also regulate 
other legitimate uses of copyrighted content bringing some clarity and consistency into 
the legal doctrine and European courts’ rulings. 
It is argued, that the process of analysing information carried in various content is not 
copyright infringing activity by itself. It is because ideas are not protected by copyright 
as such145. Copyright protects only the creative expression - the form, but not the 
information contained in that protected expression - the content146. With this said, no 
copyright holder has a right to oppose text and data mining done manually with a pen. 
Neither should this activity be restricted simply because it is performed by computers 
and on a much greater scale. 
As it was rightly articulated, “It is a universal truth that once lawful access is granted to 
a reader of an analogue book or journal they are free to extract information, imagine 
and innovate. The same must be true for computers in the modern information 
society”147. This argument is generally referred to as “the right to read is the right to 
mine”148. 
                                               143 Karapapa & Borghi, 2013, p. 47. 144 Triaille et al., 2014, p. 10. 145 A general rule prescribed both in TRIPS Agreement (Art. 9(2)) and WIPO Copyright Treaty (Art. 2). 146 Geiger, C. et al. 2018, “The Exception for Text and Data Mining (TDM) in the Proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market - Legal Aspects” (March 2, 2018). Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) Research Paper No. 2018-02. Available at SSRN: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=3160586> [2018, 25.11] or <www.dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160586> [2018, 25.11], p. 2. 147 LIBER. An open letter sent to the Licences for Europe organisers, signed by Nobel prize winners, technology SMEs, research councils, university associations, learned academies, publishers, libraries and law academics. Available: <www.web.archive.org/web/20130903133142/www.libereurope.eu/sites/default/files/Extract%20from%20email%20sent%20to%20L4E%20TDM%20chairs%20140313_0.pdf> [2018, 25.11]. 148 Moody, G. 2017, The right to read is the right to mine. Available: <www.copybuzz.com/editorial/right-read-right-mine/> [2018, 25.11] and Murray-Rust, P. 2012, 
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In this regard, Professor Martin Senftleben suggests that TDM process must be 
understood as a mere consulting of a work and, hence, has no copyright relevance149. He 
mentions that even the Commission itself referred to TDM as a process “through which 
vast amounts of digital content are read and analysed by machines”150. Therefore, TDM 
activities should be exempted from rightholders control altogether. 
However, in most of the cases, when TDM research is performed by a computer, the 
information cannot be extracted without a reproduction of protected works and, hence, 
it may lead to a copyright infringement. Some call it a paradox for a copyright law: 
“On one side, automated processing presupposes the repeated copying of whole works; 
in this respect, it is an exemplary prima facie case for infringement. On the other side, 
however, the purpose of this reproduction is to extract information from texts and about 
texts, an activity that does not normally amount to an infringement in copyright law”.151 
Furthermore, Copyright is not the only legal regime involved in the process of TDM 
research. Surely, the reproduction right, prescribed in the Art. 2 of the InfoSoc 
Directive152, is the most relevant in the context of copying materials for automated 
analysis. Besides that, because most of the data used in the TDM would be taken from 
existing collections rather than copied and OCR-ed one by one from different individual 
analogue sources, the rules governing legal status of databases come into play as well. 
In this respect, the Database Directive153 provides for two distinct means of legal 
protection of databases: 
- copyright protection of expressiveness of a database as such in case if selection 
or arrangement of contents constitute the author’s own intellectual creation;154 
                                                                                                                                         The Right to Read Is the Right to Mine. Available: <blog.okfn.org/2012/06/01/the-right-to-read-is-the-right-to-mine/> [2018, 25.11]. 149 Senftleben, M., EU Copyright Reform and Startups – Shedding Light on Potential Threats in the Political Black Box. Available: <www.innovatorsact.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Issues-Paper-Copyright-Directive-2.pdf> [2018, 25.11], p. 9. 150 Ibid., p. 9 citing European Commission, 9 December 2015, Doc. COM(2015) 626 final, p. 7. 151 Karapapa & Borghi, 2013, op. cit., note 6, p. 51. 152 The art. 2 of the InfoSoc Directive defines the reproduction right in a very broad fashion: “the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part.” 153 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases. 154 Ibid., Art. 3. 
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- sui generis database right in case of qualitatively and/or quantitatively 
substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the 
contents.155 
The TDM-related activities restricted by above-mentioned rules are a reproduction of 
database expressiveness (copyright) and an extraction of substantial parts of contents 
from a database (sui generis right). While the reproduction of database expression 
incorporated in its selections and arrangements would rather be a side effect of copying 
the contents, an act of extraction is normally necessary to copy a large number of 
materials. The CJEU noted that an act of extraction takes place when a data is 
transferred from one medium to another and then integrated into the new medium156. In 
both cases, an authorisation of respecting database owners would be required. 
In order to facilitate TDM projects in Europe the proposed Directive offers a mandatory 
exception to the exclusive rights discussed above, namely: 
- Reproduction of copyrighted works in general (InfoSoc Directive art. 2); 
- Reproduction of copyrighted expression of databases (Database Directive art. 5 
(a)); 
- Extraction of contents from databases (Database Directive art. 7 (1)); 
Additionally, the exception would cover also the newly proposed copyright for 
publishers of press publications concerning their digital uses157. However, it would be 
too soon to include this aspect into the discussion since the proposed right is highly 
controversial and was met with strong opposition from civil society stakeholders. 
It would be a significant step forward if the principle “the right to read is the right to 
mine” was implemented into the EU copyright law by virtue of the said exception. For 
that purpose, it is necessary to discuss such possibility by evaluating the compatibility 
of a broad TDM exception with a three-step test. 
The three-step test was implemented into the EU copyright law from the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). It 
                                               155 Ibid., Art. 7. 156 See e.g. C-203/02, The British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v. William Hill Organization Ltd [2004] EU:C:2004:695. 157 Art. 11(1) of the Proposal. 
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requires copyright exceptions to be “applied in certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder”158. 
In order to understand the meaning of each step, it is necessary to refer to the WTO 
interpretation of the requirement it had provided in its dispute resolution report in 2000. 
According to the Panel, a first step “certain special cases” requires that a copyright 
exception must be clearly and narrowly defined as regards its scope and reach. A 
“clearly defined” should not, however, require identifying each and possible situation 
explicitly, but at least it shall guarantee a sufficient level of legal certainty. On the other 
side, limited scope and reach shall be understood as a need of being narrow in a 
quantitative and qualitative sense159. 
A “normal exploitation of the work” within the second step was deemed to include 
forms of exploitation that currently generate significant or tangible revenue for the 
rightholder as well as those, which are likely to acquire considerable economic or 
practical importance in the future. The Panel also clarified that this requirement will be 
generally met when exempted uses are outlined in a way that precludes them entering 
into economic competition with non-exempted uses160. 
“Legitimate interests” in its turn were defined as an economic value of the exclusive 
rights conferred by law on their holders161. In terms of InfoSoc Directive, it is the right 
of reproduction (article 2), the right of communication to the public of works and right 
of making available to the public other subject-matters (article 3) and the distribution 
right (article 4). While a prohibition of an “unreasonable prejudice” shall also imply 
that a certain amount of prejudice can be justified as reasonable, the Panel did not 
though elaborate on what degree or level of harm to rightholders’ interests would reach 
a threshold of “reasonableness”. 
Hence, the given interpretation set a rather narrow space for introducing any copyright 
exception to exclusive rights. As Rita Matulionyte notes, “under the three-step test, a 
use may only be allowed in the absence of any actual, foreseeable or potential harm to 
the right holder’s sources of revenue”162. However, it still remains to answer whether 
                                               158 Art. 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive. 159 WTO panel decision DS160, US - s 110(5) Copyright Act, para 6.112. 160 WTO panel, para 6.180-6.181. 161 WTO panel, para 6.227. 162 Matulionyte, R., 2016, p. 61. 
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licencing out copyrighted materials for the purpose of TDM analysis is a normal 
exploitation of those works. Then it will become clear also whether rightholders’ 
economic interests in this form of exploitation are legitimate. 
According to the study conducted by the Charles River Associates163, the current market 
for TDM licences in the EU can be qualified as underdeveloped164. Just 1%-2% of all 
publishers own around 70% of all scientific journals. Some of those few publishers with 
an important number of journals are not available for mining projects. As a result, 
licencing possibilities narrow down only to few powerful publishers. 
Furthermore, mining requests are normally considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Publishers are wary of TDM that may result in derivative information products. As a 
result, they would require a description of each mining project. Furthermore, while 
mining for a non-commercial purpose by research institutions would be normally 
approved free of charge, commercial miners would need to pay a licencing fee165. 
Under those circumstances, it can be concluded, that although it is happening on a little 
scale nowadays, offering copyrighted content for the purpose of text and data mining is 
very likely to acquire a significant economic importance in the future. Therefore, it may 
amount to normal exploitation of works for publishers and other aggregators of large 
collections of content. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that this kind of business practice is relevant only in 
regard to database owners and not individual authors. Only aggregators of big 
collections of copyrighted works are likely to engage in offering their content for 
mining purposes and hence would have legitimate interests in remuneration. Authors a 
priori are excluded from beneficiaries of the mining use because of the limited number 
of works they could offer. 
Furthermore, not all kinds of copyrighted content are present on the TDM licencing 
market nowadays. It is only scientific, technical and medical publications that were 
discussed within the copyright reform. It could be claimed, that images also fall into the 
range of mining interests. However, it is unclear whether fictional literature, music, and 
videos would enter that market in the future.                                                163 Boulanger, J. et al. 2014, Assessing the economic impacts of adapting certain limitations and exceptions to copyright and related rights in the EU : analysis of specific policy options, European Commission. Available: <www.dx.doi.org/10.2780/20222> [2018, 25.11]. 164 Ibid., p. 62. 165 Ibid., p. 64. 
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As regards legitimate interests of rightholders, it is undoubtedly true, that database 
owners should have a right to extract economic value from their content by means of 
licencing its use for mining purposes. It is not much different, however, from granting 
access to their content in a traditional way. 
Nevertheless, according to the concept “the right to read is the right to mine”, 
rightholders’ interests to charge a fee for mining content, to which users already have 
access, cannot be deemed legitimate. It is argued, that when a lawful access to content 
was granted, nothing shall restrict a user from mining that content. In other words, it is 
not legitimate to charge first for reading articles and then charge a second time for 
mining the same articles. 
The factual conditions of mining practices are not that straightforward though. In order 
to conduct a TDM project, researchers often need to download a vast amount of content. 
That can significantly increase a load on database servers and affect the stability of the 
whole system. It may lead to situations when traditional users will face access problems 
because of few miners extracting the contents at the same time. 
To tackle this issue, some publishers decided to invest into a separate network 
infrastructure to specifically facilitate TDM downloads. It is those investments that 
rightholders should have legitimate interests to recoup. Here is the main question 
deriving from this: how to accommodate the freedom to mine with rightholders’ 
interests to return investments they make in connection with TDM? 
The author of this thesis is of opinion, that everyone shall have a right to analyse the 
content, to which they already have lawful access. That must be recognized as a basic 
principle in copyright law. That right, however, shall not confer any obligation on 
rightholders to bear additional costs in connection with simplifying content downloads. 
In other words, some restrictions in terms of speed or amount of downloads may be 
justified by the need to preserve the stability of the database platform. It shall not be 
viewed, though, as copyright enforcement measures, but rather as legitimate restrictions 
of a legitimate freedom. 
In case, when rightholders make mining-related investments to facilitate the process, 
they simply should price respecting costs into the access fee. It may lead to the creation 
of separate purpose-specific mining licences. Again, higher access fees would be 
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justified by legitimate interests to recoup investments and not by the requirement of 
separate authorisation for TDM. 
The situation would be similar, although not identical, to airport fast lanes. Everyone 
with a valid ticket can proceed to the security control. However, you can pay extra to 
get on your plane faster. Similarly, everyone with a lawful access may mine the content, 
but you may wish to pay extra to expedite the process and get your results sooner. 
On the negative side, the proposed solution would have its shortcoming in forcing 
researchers to move to facilitated TDM platforms with higher prices in a long term. It 
would essentially mean that users with a traditional access would not be able, in fact, to 
use that content for computational analysis effectively, although not explicitly 
prohibited. 
On the positive side, it would be recognized that the right to read is also the right to 
mine, what would bring about more fundamental benefits. It would add significantly to 
the legal certainty with respect to TDM uses. In addition, in situations, when access is 
not restricted and rightholders are not pursuing to explore the market of TDM licensing, 
users would be able to fully exercise their freedom to mine, although some precaution 
measures against abuses would be required. 
Furthermore, as it was mentioned before, some reasonable prejudice can be acceptable 
in respect of rightholders’ legitimate interests. Therefore, adopting a broad TDM 
copyright exception prohibiting rightholders from a discrimination of users based on a 
subscription model has a room for discussion. Simply speaking, it is worth considering 
an option of letting everyone with a lawful access to use publishers’ mining facilities 
without any extra fee or change in a subscription model. That would deprive 
rightholders a right to demand compensation for their TDM-related investments if they 
made any. 
In this respect, some commentators refer to the third step as a “proportionality test”166, 
which is often used by legislators and courts to balance conflicting rights. On the one 
hand, there is the right to property and its copyright component and, on the other hand, 
there is the freedom of the arts and science. 
                                               166 Senftleben, M. 2004, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, Kluwer Law International, p. 226. 
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Applying the proportionality test to conflicting rights, the CJEU would inter alia assess 
potential harm to rightholders as opposed to public benefits of the exception. It must be 
remembered, that the only losses, that should be considered here, are the ones that 
derive from a need to make TDM-related investments. However, there are reasonable 
grounds to claim that the damage would be minimal and easily outweighed by public 
interests. 
First, the Commission admitted in its Impact Assessment, that publishers tend to 
regularly include TDM in the subscription licences without increasing licensing fees 
significantly. It suggests that TDM does not have a significant extra value in the context 
of current subscription licences167. 
Second, the popularity of TDM researches is increasing. That means that databases 
adapted to this kind of use would attract more users in the future. The increase in the 
number of subscribers even without a significant rise in licencing fees would eventually 
generate higher profits and compensate investments into a mining infrastructure. 
There is no need to discuss the public utility of the freedom to mine at this stage to 
conclude, that there is a clear way to adopt a broad copyright exception allowing 
everyone with a lawful access to databases to analyse their contents. To put it 
differently, there are reasonable grounds supporting compliance of the broad TDM 
exception with the three-step test requirements. 
5.1.2. Scopes of the proposed exception 
In the context of TDM, the explanatory memorandum of the Proposal declares an 
objective to facilitate digital uses of protected content for the purpose of scientific 
research. This is a foundational limitation of the new exception that deserves a separate 
scrutiny before delving into the details. 
Essentially, there may be many reasons to analyse content and scientific research is only 
one of them. According to the principle “the right to read is the right to mine”, the 
mining activity per se shall have no copyright relevance. It means that it must be 
allowed to undertake a computational analysis of materials to which one has lawful 
access regardless of the purpose. Therefore, the Commission’s approach to introducing 
                                               167 European Commission (2016), Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU copyright rules, 14 September 2016, SWD(2016) 301 final, Part 1/3, p. 114. 
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the TDM exception only for the purpose of scientific research to a great extent 
undermines the said principle. 
Further, the Article 3 introduces copyright exception for text and data mining only when 
made by research organizations168. Such organizations include universities, research 
institutes or any other organizations, the primary goal of which is to conduct scientific 
research (may also provide educational services). Moreover, such organizations must 
either operate on a not-for-profit basis or pursuant to a public interest mission169. 
Hence the Commission limited the proposed exception not only by the purpose of 
scientific research but also by a kind of beneficiaries: only research organizations and 
only non-profit. It is interesting to realise, that this approach is somewhat different from 
what was already adopted in some Member States. For instance, UK adopted a TDM 
exception for a non-commercial research but for everyone with a lawful access to the 
content. Some other Member States later, with minor deviations, followed the same 
approach170. 
Arguably, the proposed rule would amount to the same non-commercial use and even 
be more restrictive. It is because “a “non-commercial” limitation would allow a 
business acting for non-commercial purposes (e.g. research, criticisms, news reporting, 
etc.) to benefit from the exception, something that is not possible under Art. 3”171 
On the other hand, there are many borderline cases, where uses cannot be unequivocally 
classified between commercial and non-commercial. Thus the Commission chose to 
limit beneficiaries by their status rather than by the character of the use, what is meant 
to make the applicability of the exception more clear. 
In the explanation of this policy option, the Commission focused solely on the licencing 
market of TDM uses exploited by STM publishers. The major demand in this market is 
presented by big life-science companies and not-for-profit research institutions. It was 
argued, that a broader exception benefiting commercial companies would deprive 
                                               168 Art 3(1) of the Proposal. 169 Ibid., Art. 2(1). 170 For example Estonia (2017), France (2016), Germany (2017) opted for a non-commercial character of use but did not discriminate beneficiaries in their corresponding TDM copyright exceptions. See Geiger et al., 2018, pp. 17-18. 171 Margoni, T. 2018, April 25, - last update, The Text and Data Mining exception in the Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Why it is not what EU copyright law needs. Available: <www.create.ac.uk/blog/2018/04/25/why-tdm-exception-copyright-directive-digital-single-market-not-what-eu-copyright-needs/> [2018, 25.11]. 
58 
rightholders their ability to subject TDM research to their licensing agreements and as a 
result lower the value of those contracts. 
In fact, the Commission admitted the ability of STM publishers to compensate potential 
losses in revenue by increasing licencing fees by virtue of the lawful access rule. 
However, it simply failed to see “whether and to what extent they would manage to do 
so”172. 
Consequently, it concluded that a broader copyright exception would require 
rightholders to renegotiate their business agreements with commercial customers 
resulting in high compliance costs. That was seemed to the Commission as an 
unjustified intervention into a purely commercial market for TDM, especially in a view 
that those commercial players had “generally not asked EU intervention in this area”173. 
This approach of the Commission deserves some substantial criticism. Firstly, it is 
principally wrong to refuse to recognise that the right to read is also the right to mine. 
Many legal academics on numerous occasions strongly recommended that the TDM 
exception under the Article 3 should apply to all lawful usage regardless of the purpose 
and character of the use174. As minimum it seems to be irresponsible to ignore 
recommendations of the European scientific community in matters of its competence. 
Secondly, while limiting the objectives of the copyright intervention only by the need to 
facilitate scientific research, it would be times more progressive to focus only on these 
purpose-specific uses. It can be understood, that the Commission aimed to prevent 
commercial exploitation of TDM uses that add little if any to the state of science. For 
that reason, a TDM exception for a research purpose would be sufficient limitation. In 
this case, a bigger number of researchers such as entrepreneurs, individual post-graduate 
students, journalists and others could engage in TDM. 
Thirdly, excluding commercial companies from beneficiaries appears to be also wrong. 
This commerciality factor is similar to the one discussed as part of the fair use doctrine 
in the US. There, in many cases, it was argued that commercial motivation cannot 
                                               172 Commission (2016), supra note 168, Part. 1/3, p. 118. 173 Ibid., pp. 116, 117. 174 See CREATE. Statement by EPIP Academics to Members of the European Parliament in advance of the Plenary Vote on the Copyright Directive on 12 September 2018. Available: <www.create.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Statement-by-EPIP-Academics.pdf> [2018, 25.11]. 
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undermine the claim of fair use when the use itself is highly transformative175. Indeed, 
most of the universally accepted forms of transformative uses such as news reporting, 
quotation, and parody are normally done commercially for profit176. Moreover, 
commercial companies, start-ups, and SMEs are more likely to invest in research and 
innovation accelerating the progress of science and technology. 
As regards the commercial market of rightholders, it was discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter, that rightholders’ legitimate interests only narrow down to 
mining-related investments. It was explained, that those losses could be compensated 
from either increase in licencing fees or in a number of subscribers, or both altogether. 
Therefore, the harm to rightholders from a broader exception would be insignificant if 
any. 
Moreover, the need to preserve a purely commercial market for TDM was probably the 
main argument for the chosen policy option. The intervention into this market was 
deemed by the Commission as unjustified. However, how can this argument apply to 
instances of mining content from databases that have no licencing models? For example 
content crawled from the Internet or social networks. How can Commission justify 
allowing only non-profit research institutions to mine freely available web content or 
social networks data, while this activity normally would not harm corresponding 
rightholders if conducted by any interested party?  
Fourth, even non-commercial scientific TDM research still could be interesting for a 
broader number of parties than only research institutions. For example journalists, 
independent researchers, post-graduate students, and others would have same legitimate 
interests to engage in TDM, especially in a view of the availability of affordable TDM 
technologies. Therefore, having an objective to promote non-commercial TDM uses for 
the purpose of scientific research, it seems slightly discriminatory to exclude mentioned 
individuals from the list of beneficiaries. 
Next, it is interesting to refer to a real-case TDM research that took place in the US and 
assess whether it would be lawful if conducted in the EU. How would proposed 
copyright exception apply in this case? Would it solve the question of legal certainty 
over reproductions that took place? 
                                               175 Supra note 84. 176 Supra note 86. 
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The study was done in 2017 at Cornell University177. Researchers copied over 100 
million pictures from Instagram and used ML algorithms in order to identify patterns in 
how clothing styles vary around the world. The results were published along with some 
samples of pictures for an illustration purpose. 
Would it happen in the EU, the University would benefit from the proposed copyright 
exception because it is a non-profit research institution envisioned by the Directive. 
However, the exception does not allow reproductions of the content used in datasets in 
the final research results, precluding hence any communication to the public of the 
mined copyrighted subject matter. 
In this respect, some argue, that it is irrelevant to extend the exception to the right of 
communication to the public, because they are unlikely to take place: “In most cases, 
while being the result of the data mining process, the report will not contain or display 
any of the data that have been “mined”178. This practical example from Cornell 
University proves them wrong. To be more specific, it shows that mining results would 
sometimes lead to reproduction of mining materials, although as a part of a scientific 
research paper. 
Technically speaking, the Art. 5(3) (a) of the InfoSoc Directive could be applied in this 
situation. It allows for reproduction and communication to the public of copyrighted 
works “for the sole purpose of illustration for ... scientific research”179. Although it 
requires to indicate the source, including the author’s name, this may be neglected if 
turns out to be impossible. 
On the other hand, this copyright exception is not mandatory and its implementation 
may vary throughout the Member States. In addition, for the purpose of verifiability of 
TDM research results, researchers might need sometimes to store source materials and 
probably also communicate them at least inside the research community180. This activity 
would trigger the right of communication to the public, but will not benefit from the 
mentioned “illustration” exception. 
                                               177 Matzen, K. et al. 2017, “StreetStyle: Exploring world-wide clothing styles from millions of photos”, arXiv. Available: <www.arxiv.org/abs/1706.01869> [2018, 25.11]. 178 Boulanger et al., 2014, p. 28. See also Geiger et al., 2018, p. 7: “the TDM output should not infringe any exclusive rights as it merely reports on the results of the TDM quantitative analysis, typically not including parts or extracts of the mined materials.” 179 Art. 5(3) (a) of the InfoSoc Directive. 180 Geiger et al., 2018, p. 7. 
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Therefore, it is recommended, that the new copyright exception covers not only initial 
reproductions and extractions needed to obtain materials to be mined but also 
consecutive activities including redistribution and communication to the public of the 
corresponding research results. That would apply only to TDM activities and only in 
relation to the original materials necessary for the purpose of TDM research. It would 
be similar to parody or quotation exceptions, where “the original work is redistributed 
but only as part of the parody or quotation”181. 
Another hurdle that this kind of research could face in the EU is the new personal data 
protection law. Because the study was conducted on images depicting real people, the 
further publication of those pictures triggers on the right to privacy. In fact, even not 
hypothetical but this particular research may risk violating the GDPR although it was 
done outside the EU. Provided of course, that pictures used for illustration belong to EU 
citizens, which is very likely to be, considering the fact that Instagram does not know 
borders and researchers were targeting clothing patterns from around the world, 
including Europe. 
Consequently, the Cornell University research could be possible in the EU under the 
proposed TDM exception. Some uncertainty is still present though in regard to 
published samples of pictures in the final research results. They could potentially 
benefit from the InfoSoc “illustration” copyright exception but could face legal scrutiny 
under the GDPR. This latter aspect would fall outside the scopes of this study though. 
At the same time, the research illustrated here could be of high interest also for 
commercial players to conduct e.g. a market research with a purpose to identify 
clothing, food, cosmetics habits across different countries, different age groups of 
people etc. For that purpose, it would also suffice to utilize a great source of Instagram 
images. However, the proposed copyright exception would not cover this activity only 
because it is performed by a commercial entity. 
In addition, pursuant to the Recital 10 of the Proposal, research organizations should 
also benefit from the exception when they engage in public-private partnerships (PPP). 
This potentially opens a way for commercial for-profit companies to benefit from the 
TDM copyright exception indirectly. 
                                               181 Margoni, T., 2018. 
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However, it is questionable to what extent this tool would be useful for private 
companies since most of the research and development projects require a high degree of 
secrecy due to market competition reasons. The risks associated with collaboration with 
a third party might exceed the benefits of relying on the mentioned copyright exception. 
Therefore, in cases that involve some important innovation like developing creative AI, 
PPP may not be an appropriate solution to avoid a copyright infringement. 
And last but not least, on 12 September 2018, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a 
position on the Copyright Directive182. In terms of the TDM exception, the EP 
suggested to include an optional copyright exception that would encourage innovation 
also in the private sector. It would be possible, however, only when “the use of works 
and other subject matter ... has not been expressly reserved by their rightholders, 
including by machine readable means”183. 
Under this EP proposal, everyone with lawful access would benefit from the TDM 
exception only in the absence of corresponding licencing schemes. In other words, the 
mining authorisation would not be required when rightholders do not expressly offer 
such service as part of their business. It looks like a limited version of “the right to read 
is the right to mine” principle. 
Albeit limited by the rightholders’ business model, this exception could become a viable 
solution for an innovation in the private sector. However, this solution would come at 
the expense of harmonisation of the EU copyright law, leading to legal uncertainty in 
cross-border uses. For example, a company in a country with broader copyright 
exception would have difficulties with mining content originating from a country that 
only adopted mandatory TDM exception in its narrow scopes. It may also lead to an 
unfortunate situation of having a different technological environment in the different 
Member States. Clearly, such optional character of the said exception would go contrary 
to the main objectives of creating a digital single market. 
The latest suggestion from the Council as a part of trilogue negotiations would limit this 
optional exception even further. In particular, it offers to allow only temporary 
                                               182 European Parliament, Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 12 September 2018 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market (COM(2016)0593 – C8-0383/2016 – 2016/0280(COD)) [Homepage of European Parliament]. Available: <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2018-0337+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#def_1_1> [2018, 25.11]. 183 Ibid., Art. 3(a). 
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reproductions and extractions of the works used in a TDM process184. In contrast, non-
profit research organizations as beneficiaries of the mandatory exception may retain 
copies for an undefined period of time in a view of the need to verify their research 
results. It does not appear reasonable to discriminate private actors in this respect. 
It can be assumed, that the Council is aiming to prevent private entities from creating a 
secondary market of those copies used in a course of TDM. However, that outcome is 
not likely due to another requirement not to use those copies for purposes other than 
TDM185. Moreover, reselling copies per se would amount to recommunication of 
original works or their adaptations and therefore would infringe on copyright. 
As the LIBER organization suggested in its open letter to EU policymakers, the 
“temporary” requirement would go contrary with the realities of data analytics and 
verification of research results. It may deter researchers from making investments into 
TDM if they only could retain working materials on a temporary basis186. 
Finally, part of the general objective of the EU copyright reform is “to promote digital 
innovation and to foster the international competitiveness of European research”187. It 
is hard to see though, how this could be effectively achieved only with help of research 
organizations under such a narrow copyright exception. The Commission itself 
recognised in its Impact Assessment that “TDM is still a nascent tool in the non-
business sector”188, i.e. universities or research institutes. 
On the other hand, private commercial companies normally would have resources and 
incentives to invest in TDM research in Europe that might eventually drive 
innovativeness and bring EU on the level playing field with the US, Canada, Japan, and 
other countries, which adopted less restrictive TDM exceptions. Disfavouring this key 
group of stakeholders could cause an opposite effect like a “brain drain” and outflow of 
investments to other jurisdictions. That seems like going contrary to what the EU is 
trying to achieve with its copyright reform. 
                                               184 Julia Reda 2018, Oct 25, Second round of trilogue negotiations. The latest compromise proposal. Available at: <www.juliareda.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Copyright-Directive_4-column-document_ARTICLES-v2-23102018.pdf> [2018, 25.11]. 185 European Parliament 2018, supra note 184, par. 2 of the art. 3(a). 186 LIBER. Europe Needs A Broad & Mandatory TDM Exception. Available: <www.libereurope.eu/blog/2018/11/13/europe-needs-a-broad-mandatory-tdm-exception/> [2018, 25.11]. 187 Commission (2016), supra note 168, Part. 1/3, p. 82. 188 Ibid., p. 104. 
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5.2. Legal grounds for output reproductions 
Unlike the process of analysis, reproduction in the outcome is not envisioned by the 
proposed TDM exception and was only addressed by some commentators as mentioned 
above. However, the primary interest of this section is to discuss the possible 
reproduction of original works in a secondary work generated by a creative AI model. 
This is a kind of reproduction that was deemed to be unlikely by various commentators 
on the TDM reform and it will be explained next why. 
The TDM process itself is a simple process of analysis and extraction. ML, on the other 
hand, would include this stage of TDM and would go further afterward. The process of 
creating a new work is distinct from TDM although is based on it. Unlike the report on 
TDM findings similar to one described in the study of clothing patterns, a creation of a 
new work is the next step to it and utilises those findings in a new way. 
A good example is an AI model generating poetry from images that was discussed in 
the fourth chapter. The process includes initial mining of the training datasets - the 
process envisioned by the EU TDM exception and is followed by a creation of new 
works, which goes beyond the EU copyright reform. 
Consequently, it is important to find possible legal rules that would govern this kind of 
reproductions in case if they take place to the extent of copyright infringement. That is 
another important question: how much copying is acceptable if any? Some recent 
decisions of national courts, as well as CJEU, may offer us some insights in this respect. 
In its well-known Infopaq decision, the CJEU specified that even as little as 11 words of 
original author’s expression are protected by copyright and unauthorised reproduction 
would lead to an infringement. To be more specific, as soon as a portion of work 
constitutes author’s own intellectual creation, which is for national courts in each 
individual case to determine, it will meet requirements of originality and, thus, copying 
of the said portion would amount to the “reproduction in part” within the meaning of the 
Art. 2 of the InfoSoc Directive189. 
Under such interpretation, first, a reproduction of some portion of copyrighted work 
would not infringe on copyright unless that portion meets requirements of originality. 
Second, normally the EU Copyright law does not offer a threshold of infringement 
                                               189 C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] EU:C:2009:465 § 51. 
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when original expression is reproduced in another work. As soon as it is original, an 
authorisation would be required. 
Nevertheless, fortunately, the EU offers some space for an effective defence case. First 
of all, it is worth considering a concept of independent creation. It is not copyright 
infringing to independently create a work even identical to already existing one. “Only 
the very act of borrowing infringes on the right of reproduction, not similarity per 
se”190. 
It may be argued, that the process of generating a new work by an AI model is not based 
on copying, but rather is a new original creation. “It is not a trivial combination of the 
data which was fed into the machine learning system”, AI generates results that never 
existed before191. ML would “break” original works into single units, which 
individually taken would not be covered by copyright. After that, it would utilise those 
single elements and, following certain patterns, compile a new work. 
On the other side, a plaintiff may argue that similarities between AI generated output 
and her original work would not happen if the work was not used in the training dataset 
in the first place. In other words, it is possible to claim and prove a causal link between 
prior mining and later copying of original expressions. 
It remains to wait and see what stance courts will take in such situations. It must be 
remembered, that AI lacks self-awareness and thus is unable to explain the rationale 
behind its results. Therefore, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine whether 
it simply copied an original expression at issue or independently created it. 
If the concept of independent creation would not apply to AI reproductions, it is still 
possible to rely on the existing copyright exceptions as a valid defence tactic. 
Depending on each individual case, even the parody exception could be invoked in 
some situations, provided of course that parody requirements are met in the secondary 
work192. However, the most interesting with respect to creative AI and less discussed in 
scientific community copyright exception concerns incidental uses of copyrighted 
works. 
                                               190 Cabay, J. & Lambrecht, M. 2015, “Remix prohibited: how rigid EU copyright laws inhibit 
creativity”, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 10, no. 5, p. 8. 191 Thoma, M., 2016, p. 1. 192 For more details on the CJEU interpretation of the parody exception refer to its groundbreaking decision on Deckmyn case (C-201/13 Johan Deckmyn v. Helena Vandersteen and others [2014] EU:C:2014:2132). 
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The said exception allows for “incidental inclusion of a work or other subject-matter in 
other material”193. It used to be a part of national copyright laws long before the 
InfoSoc Directive. The exception was normally meant to cover situations when 
copyright protected works appear in photographs and films rather by chance than 
intentionally and are of secondary importance to the main work. The scopes of it, 
however, may vary significantly in the different Member States. 
A rather broad formulation of the incidental inclusion exception in the InfoSoc 
Directive suggests that it could theoretically apply to new circumstances like the one 
with AI-generated works. One could possibly argue that an infringing outcome 
generated by an AI model was not intended to happen and is a pure incident. A 
contested original expression could be incidentally included in the compilation process. 
It can also be easy to claim that an infringing portion is of secondary importance to the 
whole new work. 
Similarly to the concept of independent creation, such argumentation could be 
countered with a claim that the initial deliberate use of the original work in training 
datasets undermines its incidental character. Accordingly, it is not easy to analyse the 
rationale behind an AI outcome and courts may face serious problems in their 
assessments. 
However, the said exception could have its stronger position in cases where a plaintiff’s 
work was not included in the mining process. As it was discussed before, there is a 
possibility that an input would be based on another work because of the cumulativeness 
of creativity. In the case of literary works, it would normally happen through quotation, 
illustration etc. As the result, it would be easier to argue incidental inclusion of that 
contested original portion of expression as it was not intentional. 
Further, the nature of AI-generated works could be compared with another type of 
transformative creations that are currently unsettled under the EU Copyright law - 
samplings. In music, sampling is an act of taking a portion or entire sound recording, 
known as a sample, and reusing it as a part of a new sound recording194. The need to 
refer to samplings is particularly relevant in cases of AI-generated music. 
                                               193 Art. 5(3)(i) of the InfoSoc Directive. 194 Wikipedia. Sampling (music). Available: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sampling_(music)> [2018, 25.11]. 
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Normally, the EU copyright offers little flexibility in regard to such creative activity. 
However, a recent copyright reference from the German Federal Court of Justice to the 
CJEU in the case Metall auf Metall III195 may alter this situation for better. 
The Metall auf Metall is an old German case in which a musician Moses Pelham took a 
two-second sample from a song “Metall auf Metall” by a German band Kraftwerk and 
used it in the song “Nur mir” performed by Sabrina Setlur. The case eventually was 
heard by the German Constitutional Court which came to the conclusion, that “if the 
artist’s freedom of creative expression is measured against an interference with the 
right of phonogram producers that only slightly limits the possibilities of exploitation, 
the exploitation interests of the phonogram producer may have to cede in favour of 
artistic dialogue”196. 
The key point implied from this decision is that the artistic freedom shall include a right 
to use parts of other authors’ works to the extent that does not harm economic interests 
of those authors. It was also emphasised, that the mere availability of licensing 
possibilities cannot adequately fulfil the freedom of artistic expression because “a right 
to be granted a license to use the sample does not exist”197. The rightholder can 
unreasonably deny licensing without any explanation. 
Following that decision the German Federal Court of Justice requested the CJEU, 
among other things, to provide a guidance on how to balance conflicting fundamental 
rights, namely the right of copyright protection198 and the freedom of arts199. It is 
particularly important for the industry of transformative uses like sampling, mash-up, 
collage, etc. By analogy, the CJEU decision could also apply to AI generated works. 
However, it would be possible only if a connection between fundamental human rights 
and AI creativity was established. 
The aforementioned task may not be that straightforward. In terms of a human 
creativity, the freedom of the arts can be easily invoked as a basis for interference with 
                                               195 Vorlage des Bundesgerichtshofs an den Europäischen Gerichtshofs zur Zulässigkeit des Tonträger-Samplings. Available: <juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2017&Sort=3&nr=78496&pos=1&anz=87> [2018, 25.11]. 196 BVerfG press Release 2016, May 31, No. 29/2016. The use of samples for artistic purposes may justify an interference with copyrights and related rights. Available: <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/bvg16-029.html> [2018, 25.11]. 197 Ibid. 198 Art. 17(2) of the EU Charter. 199 Art. 13 of the EU Charter. 
68 
someone’s copyright. However, when we employ robots to take care of the whole 
creative process, there is not much left from our artistic freedom. Rephrasing words of 
Grimmelmann and applying them in a slightly different context, when we as people take 
part in non-human creativity, we suspend our human capacities200. Consequently, we 
cannot rely on fundamental human rights and there is simply no such thing as a freedom 
of robotic arts. 
On the other side, it is not yet clear what would be a status of human involvement in AI 
creativity. Even if the work was generated completely by an AI model, there still has to 
be a human behind that process. Someone has to do some necessary arrangements 
whatever trivial they might be like choosing a style or colour density. Someone simply 
has to press a button. 
What if the fundamental freedom of arts gets interpreted in a very broad way to cover 
also instances of creating art by means of AI with a very limited personal involvement 
of a human being? That is not so illusory possibility especially in a view of the doctrine 
“sweat of the brow”, according to which a person may get his work protected even if it 
is not original or does not involve substantial creativity. 
This perception of an AI as a tool in human hands looks clearer when AI is used in a 
different from the arts field, e.g. news reporting or online translation. It can be argued, 
that expressive AI is a simple tool of human engagement with information. The freedom 
of information does not require any level of human intellectual creativity. Therefore a 
user of an expressive AI model may still invoke the right to receive and impart 
information and ideas as it is guaranteed both by the EU Charter and the ECHR. 
As a result, fundamental human rights could serve some defensive ground in case of 
reproductions in the outcome. However, it is uncertain at this point whether the 
proportionality requirements would be met in such cases.  
                                               200 Grimmelmann, J. 2016, p. 667. The original citation is “When we talk about nonexpressive uses, we should perhaps refer to them by another name: non-human uses. When we as people take part in these uses, we suspend our human capacities.” 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
“When someone builds a new technology and 
people love it, the legal system will evolve to 
allow it.” (by Randal C. Picker)201 
The present research has delved into peculiarities of AI expansion to the creative 
industry. It would be fair to view this invasion as another chapter of the long-lasting 
story of an interaction between digital technologies and copyright laws. Accordingly, 
this piece of study is meant to contribute to the discussion that already started over the 
applicability of old laws to new uses of protected works. It also prompted a critical 
analysis of the ongoing EU Copyright reform. 
The appearance of non-display uses on the copyright regulated stage was not sudden. 
More conventional technological applications such as web caching technologies, books 
digitization projects and others preceded its coming. Fortunately, to some extent, they 
paved a way for the present enquiry with a solid argumentation developed throughout 
judicial debates. 
On the west shore of Atlantic, those technological uses successfully tested a reach of the 
fair use doctrine proving its right to exploit copyright protected works when it does not 
harm rightholders. In Europe, the same technologies were met with a traditional 
hostility of national copyrights. While some countries refused to tolerate unauthorised 
reproductions regardless of any justifications, others practiced their agility in finding 
some basic principles of law to protect legitimate technologies. 
In particular, the US case law demonstrated that computer processing of works even on 
a large scale may be found lawful if it does not lead to a creation of substitutes. The 
requirement of transformativeness had its clear application as a functionality test: it may 
be lawful to make a copy when a secondary work performs a different function than that 
of the original, regardless of any similarities between two of them. Hence, copies made 
for the ML training process shall be viewed exactly in this fashion: they are not used as 
substitutes and perform a completely different function. 
                                               201 Picker, R. C. 2015, “Internet Giants: The Law and Economics of Media Platforms”, The University of Chicago, Coursera online subject, lecture notes, viewed Jan 2018. Available: <www.coursera.org/learn/internetgiants> [2018, 25.11]. In the context of Sony Betamax case. 
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Furthermore, the very nature of ML uses fit very well into the definition of 
transformativeness developed by judge Leval: they use copyrighted works as raw 
material and then transform them into new information, new expressive works. Thus it 
seems to be a type of use that the fair use doctrine is meant to support. 
The analysis of the market of works for ML uses demonstrated a lack of significant 
danger for rightholders’ interests arising from unauthorised uses of their works. Authors 
typically do not create works to be used in ML training datasets. And the market of 
database content for ML purposes is still underdeveloped. 
The study also discussed a potential outcome that expressive AI may disrupt a creative 
industry and oust human authors from their traditional markets. Regardless of how 
significant it may happen to be, any negative impact on the human creative industry 
would derive from an activity not restricted by copyright. It is viewed by this paper as a 
logical consequence of “AI-ization” of different aspects of human life. 
There appear to be no meaningful issues with possible reproduction of original human 
expressiveness in AI-generated outcomes. They are not likely to occur in the first place. 
But should they happen and exceed a trivial level they might still find protection under 
the fair use. In other cases, the US copyright case law has developed a number of rules 
on how to assess potential copyright infringement. Although AI creativity may lead to 
numerous copyright trials in a near future that would possibly receive media headlines 
like “Humans vs AI”, things are more or less certain in that respect. 
As can be seen, ML and expressive AI seem to receive a green light from a copyright 
law in the US. It becomes possible mainly owing to a flexible and technologically-
friendly doctrine of fair use. It would be a consistent follow-up approach after a range 
of similar decisions on other technological uses. 
In Europe, the InfoSoc Directive became partially outdated as soon as the new computer 
uses, understandably unforeseen by the lawmakers at that time, became a common 
practice for global Internet search engines. Quite ironically, it happened no later than 
the Directive was implemented by the last EU Member State - in the same year of 2006. 
It is then not surprising that ML copies of works would hardly find any protection from 
the reach of exclusive rights of copyright holders. Copyright laws must be reconsidered 
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every time “when technology renders the assumptions on which they were based 
outmoded”202. 
A close study of the ongoing copyright reform in Europe demonstrated that ML uses fit 
well into the category of Text and Data Mining. Therefore a future of research into the 
field of expressive AI depends now very much on the scopes of the copyright exception 
that will be adopted soon. It has been discussed in this research that the mining activity 
a priori has no copyright relevance as facts and ideas are not protected. Therefore it is 
suggested that the freedom to read must be also the freedom to mine. 
The art of making copyright laws is far from ideal though. The main stakeholders would 
unlikely agree to the law that would leave them worse off compared to what they 
currently receive. A broad copyright exception would go contrary with interests of STM 
publishers that get revenue from life-science companies mining their content. That was 
described as a main concern of the Commission when choosing a policy option. 
However, this thesis demonstrated that a broad approach to exempting mining activity 
from a reach of copyright would likely comply with the three-step test. The more 
fundamental benefits of the said exception would outweigh any potential losses to 
legitimate interests of database owners. Therefore it appears that there are no other 
constraints to ensure a mining freedom except a political will of EU legislative 
institutions. 
The latest trilogue consultations between the Council, the European Parliament, and the 
Commission suggest very limited possibilities for ML and expressive AI in Europe. It 
has been offered to adopt a mandatory copyright exception for TDM conducted only by 
non-profit research institutions and only for scientific research purposes. The Member 
States would be offered an optional right also to extend such an exception to benefit 
private actors but only in relation to content not exploited in this regard by its 
rightholders. 
It remains to wait and see what would be a final result of the compromise, however at 
this point it appears certain, that ML and AI developments in Europe would be 
restricted in terms of getting training materials. As Jessica Litman rightly observed, “the 
institutional and legal structure of the copyright community makes it difficult to prevent 
                                               202 Litman, J. 2006, Digital copyright, 2nd ed. edn, Prometheus Books, Amherst, N.Y. p. 22. 
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foolish approaches to new technology”203. Such a regrettable outcome would signify an 
unwillingness of the EU policymakers to accept the fact that old analogue rules may not 
serve the same balancing function in a new digital world. 
It would not come by surprise though, as the history of EU copyright harmonisation 
often prioritised the interests of industry over users’ rights despite alerting messages 
from the academic community204. As Rita Matulionyte observed, “in the EU, legislators 
often seem to assume that creativity and innovation are encouraged by granting 
increasingly broad and exclusive rights to creators and industries”205. They must be 
wondering then why most of the world-spread technologies originate from the US or 
other countries. 
As regards possible claims of copyright infringements as pertaining to AI-generated 
works, national copyrights still may offer some room for effective defence strategy. 
Besides limited applicability of the concept of independent creation and some copyright 
exceptions like the one covering incidental inclusions, it is more interesting to see a 
potential impact of fundamental human rights in this respect. In particular, the freedom 
of science and arts, as well as the freedom of information may serve a balancing role 
against the monopoly of copyright holders. The CJEU still has to say its word in this 
respect. 
By and large, making copies of works for the purpose of ML would normally not result 
in outright copyright infringement either in the US or in Europe. Emerging technologies 
need access to qualitative content and they are likely to receive it. Although in Europe, 
traditionally high level of protection of copyright would place more restrictions upon 
the use of protected works. 
                                               203 Ibid. 204 See in general Farrand, B. 2014, Networks of Power in Digital Copyright Law and Policy, Routledge Ltd, London. 205 Matulionyte, R., 2016, p. 54. 
